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Chapter 1: Introduction
In December 2005, the irst report on the Communities and Local 
Government Affordability Model was published (ODPM 2005). The model 
was developed in response to the recommendations of the Barker Review of 
Housing Supply (Barker 2004), notably its call for the establishment of 
affordability targets for housing at both national and regional levels. As the 
introduction to the irst report explained, the model was developed to 
provide an appropriate methodology whereby affordability targets could be 
translated into regional housing targets in a manner that was consistent 
across the regions. The econometric model, therefore, provided an 
integrated structure for the Government Ofice Regions (GORs), determining 
prospective future movements in house prices, earnings, migration patterns, 
household formation and employment. The interaction between all these 
factors provided estimates of housing affordability, measured primarily by the 
ratio of house prices to earnings, both at the lowest quartile, although the 
model also measures affordability in terms of other indicators, including 
mortgage repayment to income ratios and the housing user cost of capital. 
Furthermore, by examining alternative future house building scenarios, the 
model was capable of examining the impact on affordability of higher levels 
of construction than were planned under Regional Planning Guidance at 
that time. A range of possible scenarios was presented in the irst report.
The model was well received by its external peer reviewers and has been 
heavily used within Communities and Local Government for policy analysis, 
for example in order to examine the implications of revised Regional Spatial 
Strategies and the Government’s commitment to raising the rate of net 
housing additions to 240,000 units per annum by 2016, signalled in the 
2007 green paper, Homes for the Future: More Affordable, More Sustainable 
(Cm 7191). Of course, the model is only one input into the policy-making 
process and acts as an aid to rather than a replacement for policy. But 
models never remain constant and develop in response to new policy 
concerns and intellectual ideas. Furthermore, a range of different concerns 
was expressed in response to the irst report, requiring further research and 
clariication. This second report is the response to all these issues. Perhaps, 
inevitably, the model structure has become more complex as a result. This 
new version of the model, described here, was the basis of the model used 
for the projections produced by the new National Housing and Planning 
Advice Unit (NHPAU, 2007),1 which suggested that affordability would 
deteriorate, under the plans set out under the Regional Spatial Strategies, up 
to 2026, a conclusion which has received widespread coverage.
The irst set of developments concern the modelling of tenure. In England, 
the proportion of owner-occupiers has changed little since 2000 and has 
remained static at about 70 per cent of households. In itself, this is not 
necessarily cause for concern, since there has been a resurgence in the 
1 Also established as one of the recommendations of the Barker Review.
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private rental sector since the middle of the nineties and, arguably, a healthy, 
good quality, rental stock is more suitable to the lifestyles of young, mobile 
households. However, the failure of households to achieve home ownership 
has implications for the distribution of wealth and the desire to increase 
home-ownership rates at a time of rising house prices is understandable. But 
if ownership has not increased in recent years, then we need to understand 
the reasons. Is expansion being undermined by poor affordability, credit 
market conditions or supply shortages, for example. A model of tenure 
choice has, therefore, been added, based on micro data, distinguishing 
between ownership and renting in the public and private sectors. This 
report presents the results of this research.
The second strand of developments discussed in this report arises from 
comments on the irst report. In the earlier study, some of the scenarios 
run on the model involved large increases in construction. These implied that 
the growth in housing units might be in excess of the expected number of 
households.2 Although such increases were found to have signiicant effects 
on affordability, the question arises who would live in the extra homes? 
Analytically, this turns out to be a dificult, although interesting question, 
given that, traditionally, planning for housing has been based on matching 
numbers of units to the number of households. The question is addressed 
here and it is argued that the addition of affordability targets, on top of 
traditional goals, fundamentally affects the nature of planning for housing. 
It raises issues of housing vacancies, demolitions, second homes and the 
quality of the housing stock. More broadly, the model needs to consider 
how long-run equilibrium occurs in a housing system.
It is important to stress what this report does not attempt to do. It does not 
set out the full set of equations in the model, for example house prices, 
migration and the labour market. Full information on the model’s equations 
and their inter-linkages were set out in the technical appendix accompanying 
the irst report (www.communities.gov.uk/publications/housing/
affordabilitytargetsimplications). Here, the report concentrates only on the 
extensions to the model since the irst phase, although full details of the 
equations for these extensions are given.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the key features of the model. Chapter 3 
concentrates on modelling tenure and chapter 4 on issues of long-run 
equilibrium. Each of the chapters considers both the theory and empirical 
results. Chapter 5 turns to policy and considers a selection of model 
simulations, designed to illustrate features of the new model that distinguish 
it from the previous version and, indeed, from the wider housing literature. 
Chapter 6 draws conclusions.
2 In fact, the oficial 2004 based household projections were subsequently revised upwards.
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Chapter 2: A brief overview 
of the model
The key features of the affordability model are shown in the low chart, 
igure 1. For the purposes of this overview, it is convenient to treat earnings 
and the labour market as independent of the rest of the model. These 
elements have not changed since the earlier version of the model and, 
consequently, are not discussed here. A fuller low chart can be found in the 
irst report. However, all low charts are simpliications and much of the 
richness of the model cannot readily be portrayed by this means. For 
example, the model is dynamic and complete adjustment to change does 
not take place within a single time period. But dynamics cannot easily be 
represented within a simple low chart.
In the igure, most (but not all) of the econometric relationships to be 
modelled are set out on the left-hand side – these cover inter-regional 
migration, the probability that any individual will form a separate household, 
tenure choice and the demand for housing. The central column deines the 
main aggregate outcomes – the total number of households, the allocation 
of total households across the tenures, house prices, rents and affordability. 
Vacancies/demolitions/second homes are aggregate outcomes, but are 
formally modelled. These are discussed in detail in chapter 4. Importantly, all 
the variables on the left-hand side could be affected by changes in housing 
costs and, therefore, there is a link back to these variables from the aggregate 
level of affordability (dotted line), where affordability is determined by market 
clearing processes. Furthermore, if the future trend in affordability changes 
relative to the past, all the variables in the model are affected. Note that, here, 
we are treating affordability as a generic term, rather than as one particular 
oficial indicator. The feedbacks to the rest of the model are determined by 
average house prices, incomes and interest rates, for example.
The box at the top of the igure deines sets of variables that are determined 
outside the structure of the model. These include the population at the end 
of the previous year (t-1), births, deaths, and international migration. Some 
of these variables may also be affected by housing costs, but we judge the 
likely responses to be fairly low and the central ideas can be illustrated 
without the addition.3 As noted above, the box at the bottom of the 
diagram (average earnings) is treated in a similar manner for the purposes 
of this chapter. Earnings are the denominator in the government’s chosen 
deinition of affordability.
The bottom left-hand corner gives the supply of private housing. Although 
it might be expected that the variable would be responsive to changes in 
house prices, across the English regions, Meen (2005) indicates that the price 
elasticity of new housing supply has fallen to close to zero since the nineties. 
3 In fact, work is currently underway to endogenise international migration in the model.
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In the model, the supply of housing is treated as a policy instrument. In the 
Barker Review context, if affordability worsens beyond a given target, further 
construction is brought on to the market. Note that “new housing” is stated 
in italics above. This emphasises the fact that the housing stock can be 
increased not only by new building, but also by conversions and renovations 
of the existing stock.
The equations in the left-hand column employ a combination of micro and 
aggregate data. The probabilities of household formation and tenure choice 
are estimated on individual data from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), whereas the inter-regional migration and owner-occupier housing 
demand equations4 use regional time-series information. In each of the 
central equations housing costs are an important determinant, but not the 
only inluence. Therefore, table 1 sets out the main5 inluences for each. The 
relationships for tenure are discussed further in chapter 3. However, it is 
helpful to discuss the demand for housing here since it highlights a common 
fallacy that is critical in the context of affordability targets.
Table 1: The Key Equations: Summary of the Main Inluences
Influences
House Prices Number of households, the stock of dwellings, real 
earnings, interest rates.
Probability of 
Household 
Formation
Marital status, age, gender, children, real housing 
costs, real incomes, previous household status.
Tenure Tenure costs, real incomes, credit conditions, previous 
tenure, marital status, age, children, gender.
Inter-regional 
Migration
Relative house prices, housing availability, relative 
earnings, unemployment.
First, an important distinction needs to be made between the number of 
housing units demanded and supplied and the level of housing services that 
arises from those units. In much of the time-series literature on house price 
models a simplifying assumption is made that the supply of housing services 
is a ixed proportion of the stock of housing units, although, in fact, the 
expectation is that bigger houses include higher levels of services. The 
assumption is necessary because no time-series information is published on 
the supply of services directly. Therefore, in formal house price models, the 
stock of housing units is employed as a factor affecting prices, rather than 
the more appropriate concept – the supply of housing services. In many 
contexts, the simplifying assumption generates only second order problems, 
but, in the context of the affordability model, the distinction is important. 
In most instances, we would prefer to model the demand and supply of 
4 Strictly, regional house price equations are estimated from which the demand functions can be inferred.
5 In fact, some of the equations include further inluences, for example, the house price equations (see Meen et al 
(2005) for full equation details). But those appearing in the table are the key factors for determining the model’s 
properties.
A Brief Overview of the Model | 5
housing services, but with one important exception discussed in chapter 4, 
we are forced to rely on data for the number of units.
To see why the distinction is important, the traditional planning approach 
attempts to relate housing construction (or more precisely net additions to 
the housing stock), measured in units, to the expected future number of 
households. But it is not the case that this will necessarily stabilise 
affordability. The fallacy lies in treating all units as identical, whereas, as 
noted above, different houses, in fact, contain different levels of housing 
services. Consider the following housing services demand equation (1), 
which is representative of the literature.
 (1)
where:
Hd = Aggregate demand for owner-occupier housing services
Y = Real average earnings
PH = Real house prices
HH = Total number of households
r = Mortgage interest rate
ε
1
 = error term
ln = natural logarithm
a
i
 = set of coeficients (elasticities)
For a ixed (short run) supply of services, market equilibrium implies the 
house price equation.
(2)
where
Hs = Supply of housing services (assumed in the model’s house price 
equations to be proportional to the stock of units). 
If a
3
 = 1 (i.e. the demand for housing services rises proportionately to the 
number of households), then equation (2) can be simpliied to (3).
 (3)
In (3), a proportionate rise in both the housing stock and the number of 
households leaves real house prices unchanged. But, then, affordability, 
ln(PH/Y), is constant only if (a
1
/a
2
) = 1, for given values of the other variables. 
If (a
1
/a
2
) > 1, then affordability worsens over time (assuming growing 
incomes), even if HS=HH. However, (a
1
/a
2
) > 1 implies that the income 
elasticity of housing demand is higher than the price elasticity and, in fact, 
most time-series studies ind this to be the case (e.g. Muellbauer and 
Murphy 1997). In the affordability model, the income elasticity of demand 
is approximately one and the price elasticity –0.5, so (a
1
/a
2
) = 2. Therefore, 
affordability worsens over time unless supply rises faster than the number of 
households or some other market stabiliser operates, for example, changes 
in interest rates. But, of course, house prices are only one of the factors 
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taken into account by the Bank of England in setting interest rates. This 
is the main reason why the NHPAU concluded that affordability would 
worsen over the future on RPG construction plans.
In terms of the underlying economics, the equation implies that, as incomes 
rise, existing households demand a higher quantity of housing services than 
they currently hold. This might imply second homes or bigger houses in 
better neighbourhoods, for example. It may also involve a tenure change.6 
The model, therefore, introduces a form of iltering of the housing stock, 
where higher income households move to higher quality homes and the 
homes they vacate ilter down to those further down the income 
distribution. But notice that the iltering process has little meaning if all 
dwellings are treated as identical units, rather than varying by size or the 
quantity of services embodied within each unit. This distinction becomes 
particularly important in chapter 4 when vacancies and demolitions are 
discussed, although data deiciencies sometimes mean that slightly uneasy 
compromises have to be made. In particular, vacancies and demolitions can 
only be measured in terms of units. But, at this point in the report, the main 
message is that matching dwelling growth to the expected number of 
households does not ensure stabilisation of affordability.
A inal point is that equation (3) determines house prices in the model. But 
to determine the distribution of households between tenures, assumptions 
are needed concerning relative housing costs in each. Because of past 
constraints on private rents and the administered nature of social rents, 
relationships from historical data cannot be estimated. But in a market 
system, it is more relevant to assume a direct relationship between the three 
tenure prices. In a long-term setting, failure to do so will imply that all 
households will choose the cheapest sector, for a property of a given quality, 
in the absence of other constraints (e.g. supply shortages).
6 It could also involve households buying additional homes through Buy-to-Let mortgages.
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Figure 1: Flow Chart of the Model
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Chapter 3: Modelling tenure
3.1 Macroeconomic trends
Housing market outcomes depend strongly on underlying macroeconomic 
conditions. Therefore the irst section in this chapter briely reviews recent 
changes in some of the main macroeconomic variables. The section also 
includes an examination of tenure trends over the last two decades, 
concentrating on two major changes – the rise in the age of irst-time 
purchase and the increasing importance of the private rental market. From 
this the structure of the model is developed (section 3.2) and empirical 
results are presented (section 3.3). Key properties and policy implications 
are drawn out in section 3.4.
As a generalisation, changes in house prices and affordability relect 
movements in key macroeconomic indicators, but with a higher degree of 
volatility. Since 1996, for example, consistent income growth, low interest 
rates and weak housing supply have all been contributors to the growth in 
house prices. But there is still considerable disagreement over the extent to 
which prices can be explained by fundamentals as opposed to speculative 
bubbles, (Meen 2007). Figure 2 graphs movements in real incomes (and GDP 
for comparison). The graph shows that, on an annual basis, real household 
incomes have not fallen since 1982 and survived the recession of the early 
nineties better than GDP as a whole. Furthermore, although real incomes 
have not grown at the same rate in recent years as in the previous housing 
boom of the late eighties, growth has been steady (and arguably more 
sustainable) around the long-run growth rate of the economy.
Figure 3 graphs the most commonly quoted indicator of housing 
affordability – the house price to income ratio. Prices are measured here as 
averages, rather than lower quartiles. The denominator is household 
disposable income, although using average earnings instead has little effect 
on the movements in the ratio over time. On this indicator, housing 
affordability is worse than in the boom of the late eighties. However, 
considerable caution is needed. The price/income ratio is only one indicator 
of affordability and the equations in the affordability model (summarised in 
equation 3) imply that there are a wide range of other factors that affect 
prices and affordability, in addition to income, notably interest rates, housing 
supply and demographics. Changes in any of these factors will alter the 
long-run ratio of house prices to incomes. Most obviously nominal interest 
rates are now much lower. Since these are capitalised into house prices, the 
simple house price to income ratios would be expected to be higher than in 
earlier cycles. As an illustration, igure 4 shows mortgage repayments as a 
percentage of income for irst-time buyers. Although the indicator does not 
capture the distribution of repayments, it makes the point that repayment 
ratios are still below those in the late eighties and early nineties on average. 
On this indicator at least, repayments may not have been the prime 
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constraint affecting irst-time buyers in recent years. Nevertheless, the 
second line of the graph illustrates the increasing deposit requirement, 
which, we show below, is an important constraint on ownership in the 
model.
Finally, the fall in the share of mortgages going to irst-time buyers in recent 
years has received considerable comment and a key indicator is shown in 
igure 5. During the eighties and nineties, the share averaged approximately 
50 per cent, but fell to a minimum of around 30 per cent in the early years 
of this decade. The share has yet to return to the longer-run average.
Figure 2: Household Income and GDP (Annual percentage changes)
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Figure 3: National House Price to Income Ratios (2002 Q1=100)
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Figure 4: Mortgage Repayments and Deposits (%)
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Figure 5: Loans to First-Time Buyers (%)
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National trends may disguise regional variations. The central affordability 
target in the model is the ratio of lower quartile house prices to earnings, 
where the latter is measured by data taken from the Annual Survey of Hours 
and Earnings (ASHE) and its predecessor the New Earnings Survey (NES). 
Values in table 2 approximate the ratios in April of each year in order to 
match the survey month for ASHE.
The table indicates that the country can be divided into three blocs – the 
South, Midlands and the North; within each bloc the affordability ratios are 
similar, but between the blocs, there are major differences. This relects the 
fact that, within the blocs, house prices have risen at very similar rates over 
time in both the short run and long run. Furthermore, comparing the blocs, 
differences in house price growth exist in the short run, but the differences 
tend towards equalisation over the longer term. This is a manifestation of 
the ripple effect, where, over successive cycles since the early seventies 
house prices have risen irst in the southern regions with the northern 
regions catching up at a later date. An alternative way of presenting these 
relative regional movements is to consider the contemporaneous correlation 
in annual house price growth. These are shown in table 3, which again 
illustrates a very strong correlation in growth rates amongst near neighbours. 
Note that the “South” aggregates the South East and East regions and the 
“North” aggregates the North West and North East GORs, in order to 
minimise the problems associated with the switch from Standard Statistical 
Regions to Government Ofice Regions bases.
At irst sight, table 2 indicates that affordability has worsened noticeably 
since the late nineties. But the values are the regional relections of the 
national trends in igure 3 and take no account of lower levels of interest 
rates. Nevertheless, on whatever measure, table 2 illustrates differing 
regional conditions. Consequently affordability and deposit requirement 
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problems are likely to be greater in the South. This is relected in the results 
from the model.
Table 2: Lower Quartile House Price to Earnings Ratios (workplace basis)
Region 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
London 3.99 5.58 6.30 7.31 7.73 8.25 8.50 8.64 9.14
South 
East
4.32 5.36 5.83 6.90 7.48 8.09 8.62 8.58 8.89
East 3.75 4.43 5.02 5.96 6.68 7.57 8.01 8.03 8.56
South 
West
4.07 4.81 5.44 6.37 7.11 8.17 8.55 8.47 8.96
East 
Midlands
3.28 3.52 3.72 4.34 4.88 6.07 6.46 6.69 7.03
West 
Midlands
3.47 3.62 3.88 4.42 4.98 5.95 6.47 6.78 6.88
Yorks. & 
Humber
3.15 3.08 3.07 3.25 3.48 4.79 5.32 5.80 6.26
North 
West
2.99 2.90 2.95 3.10 3.28 4.42 5.00 5.61 5.94
North 
East
2.86 2.78 2.78 2.85 3.09 4.14 4.75 5.30 5.51
England 3.65 3.98 4.22 4.72 5.23 6.27 6.82 7.12 7.25
Source: CLG Live Table 576
Table 3: Contemporaneous Correlations in the Annual Growth Rates of 
Regional House Prices (1970-2006)
London South SW EM WM North YH
London 1 0.932 0.880 0.676 0.707 0.525 0.484
South 0.932 1 0.978 0.854 0.865 0.646 0.640
SW 0.880 0.978 1 0.914 0.927 0.730 0.732
EW 0.676 0.854 0.914 1 0.962 0.873 0.897
WM 0.707 0.865 0.927 0.962 1 0.863 0.881
North 0.525 0.646 0.730 0.873 0.863 1 0.960
YH 0.484 0.640 0.732 0.897 0.881 0.960 1
In addition to the strength of house prices, perhaps the two most important 
changes over the last ten years were the rise of the age of entry into home 
ownership and the increasing share of private renting (particularly the 
elements commonly known as the Buy-to-Let market) in some regions. In 
fact, the two events were not independent since the improvement in the 
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latter led to an acceptable substitute in terms of housing quality for many, 
primarily younger, households. Table 4 summarises the tenure trends since 
the mid eighties, disaggregated by the age of the household head. Here 
“young” households are deined as those where the age of the head is 
under 30.
Young adult homeownership rates rose in the second half of the eighties 
and fell in the nineties and in the current decade, with large falls in both 
groups identiied in the table. The reductions in their homeownership rates 
coincided with increases in private renting, with the proportions in social 
renting remaining largely unchanged. Thus, the igures imply a switch away 
from owner occupation to private renting at an early stage of a person’s 
life-cycle.
There are a number of further points to note. First, there is a correlation 
between ownership rates and the economic cycle. This is most evident in the 
second half of the eighties, where the ownership rate amongst all three age 
groups rose sharply. Expectations of capital gains were high and real income 
was rising strongly. But the percentage of owners (particularly amongst the 
20-24 group) had fallen back again by 1993/94 i.e. before the Buy-to-Let 
market began to take off. Therefore, the initial decline in young home 
owners cannot be ascribed to the development of this new sector, but 
occurred because of underlying market conditions.
Table 4: Trends in Housing Tenure Among Young Adults
Year Owner occupied Social rented Private rented
Aged 20 to 24 percentages
1984 35 33 33
1988 41 28 30
1991 38 27 35
1993/4 34 31 35
1996/7 28 28 44
1997/8 26 29 44
1998/9 25 32 43
1999/00 27 28 45
2000/1 26 30 44
2001/2 25 30 44
2002/3 28 30 42
2003/4 25 29 46
2004/5 19 28 53
2005/6 20 28 52
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Year Owner occupied Social rented Private rented
Aged 25 to 29 percentages
1984 60 24 16
1988 64 23 13
1991 63 21 16
1993/4 59 21 19
1996/7 54 23 23
1997/8 55 22 23
1998/9 52 23 24
1999/00 54 20 26
2000/1 54 21 26
2001/2 50 21 28
2002/3 51 21 28
2003/4 50 20 30
2004/5 49 18 33
2005/6 46 19 34
Source: CLG Survey of English Housing
Second, although not evident from the table, Andrew and Meen (2003) 
argue that part of the reason for the decline in ownership amongst young 
households in the irst part of the nineties was a change in the income 
distribution. In particular, the incomes of older households were growing 
at a faster rate than young households. The inequalities of the early nineties 
have not currently been fully unwound, although there has been some 
improvement in the position of young households. But again, this factor 
implies that there were market tendencies that encouraged a move to 
private renting, irrespective of the subsequent developments in the private 
rental market.
Third, the reduction in owners in the 20-24 age group occurred at a similar 
time to the increased deposit requirement for irst-time buyers, shown in 
igure 4, and the reduction in the percentage of loans to irst-time buyers 
in igure 5. Therefore, the inancial constraints, particularly in terms of 
deposits, provide a prima facie case for including such constraints in the 
Affordability Model.
Table 4 shows that, although the decline in young ownership was not 
initially contemporaneous with the introduction of Buy-to-Let loans, the 
proportion of young households in private renting subsequently expanded 
substantially. Nevertheless, the impact on the size of the private rented 
sector should not be overstated. Despite the rapid rise in Buy-to-Let loans 
since the mid-nineties, the improvement in the size of the private rental 
Modelling Tenure | 15
market can be overstated. In 1991 in England, 9.8 per cent of the dwelling 
stock was private rentals (including dwellings tied to employment). This had 
risen to 11.9 per cent in 2006. In London the increase is more noticeable, 
from 13.3 per cent to 18.7 per cent.7 In the South East the respective igures 
are 10.6 per cent and 12.2 per cent. Therefore, despite the publicity 
surrounding the growth of the sector, the effects are modest in terms of the 
stock and seen against the historic long-term decline of the sector. 
Furthermore, the effects are localised, concentrated on London, although it 
should be noticed that even in the North East, where private renting is 
relatively small scale, the share rose from 7.2 per cent in 1991 to 9.3 per 
cent in 2006. Given the younger age distribution of the population in 
London, it is unsurprising that the strongest rise should be in this region.
3.2 Model structure
3.2.1 Evidence from the literature
The US and Australian literatures, where most previous empirical work has 
been conducted, typically model the binary choice between ownership and 
private renting. This may be justiied on the grounds that social housing is 
generally a smaller proportion of the total housing stock than in England, 
although in some Australian states and US metropolitan areas public housing 
is an important part of the total. Binary choices are relatively straightforward 
in modelling terms. But, in England, there are additional technical issues 
associated with modelling multiple choices since social housing has to be 
explicitly included. Furthermore, UK housing is not a purely market-driven 
system and issues of tenure accessibility, supply shortages and rationing, 
taxes and subsidies all, in principle, need to be taken into account. Therefore 
not only is it necessary to model three tenures, but also to take account of 
choices constrained by the institutional framework.
As shown in the last section, the proportion of young households entering 
ownership has fallen signiicantly since the early nineties. Although there are 
a number of potential explanations, such as changes in relative tenure costs, 
expectations of capital losses and changes in the income distribution, the 
inability to raise a suficient deposit is likely to be part of the story, despite 
increasing reliance on families by some irst-time buyers. But this gives rise to 
a second set of modelling problems – how to incorporate different forms of 
credit market constraints into the model.
These issues – multiple tenure choices, the incorporation of credit restrictions 
and, more generally, the complexities of the system – are the novel features 
to be incorporated into the model.
Until recently, the tenures were fairly distinct. Because of the shortage of 
good-quality accommodation in the private rental sector, most households 
who could afford to do so went quickly into the owner-occupier sector after 
relatively short periods of time in the private rented sector. One of the 
7 Note that this refers to the dwelling stock, not the household stock.
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important changes introduced by the expansion in the investment market in 
recent years is that properties of similar quality to those available in owner-
occupation have become available – properties in the two sectors have 
become more homogeneous. The availability of closer substitutes is expected 
to affect the responsiveness of tenure to relative prices.
One early strand of the US literature used time-series information to estimate 
the demand for owner-occupation (for example Rosen and Rosen 1980). 
Amongst the variables used as determinants was the relative price of owning 
to renting. Other variables included income and demographic factors. The 
early US time-series (and cross-sectional studies) typically found a signiicant 
impact from relative housing costs, but due to the segmentation of the 
market, no UK study found an effect (nor in most cases were they tested). 
The sophistication of studies has improved considerably since the early days, 
but it remains the case that relative prices, incomes and demographic factors 
are still key determinants of tenure demand.
A major boost to tenure studies in the US occurred in the late seventies and 
early eighties. The US, in line with the UK, provided tax breaks for owner-
occupied housing. However, the literature pointed out that, particularly at 
times of high inlation (for example US inlation in 1981 was 10 per cent), 
the tax advantages caused distortions in the housing market. First, the 
beneits distorted tenure choices towards owner-occupation – Wood (2001), 
for example, found that in Australia almost all home owners would have had 
lower costs due to the tax advantages;8 second, they raised the real price of 
housing; third, they distorted portfolio choices towards housing and away 
from inancial assets, which some considered to be more productive (see for 
example, Ebrill and Possen 1982, Hendershott and Hu 1981, 1983, Summers 
1981, Kau and Keenan 1983). Given similar tax advantages and inlation 
rates in the UK, the same conclusions were reached on UK data by Buckley 
and Ermisch (1982).
With the decline in inlation rates and the reduction in tax advantages to 
owner-occupation, less emphasis on these distortionary issues is now evident 
in the literature. Nevertheless, the literature provided a useful set of models 
set in a general equilibrium framework that can be used in a variety of other 
settings. General equilibrium models attempt to trace through the full set of 
results across markets of, for example, policy changes, rather than looking 
only at the effects directly on the market of interest. Swan (1984), sets out a 
fairly early model in which house prices and rents are determined within the 
structure of a model of tenure choice. One of the issues that arises in the 
affordability model is the relationship between rents and house prices in a 
general equilibrium setting.
The models examined so far typically assume that buyers do not face credit 
market constraints. Since mortgage market liberalisation occurred relatively 
early in the US, this may have been a reasonable approximation. But, at the 
time, this was not a reasonable characterisation of the UK market. Meen 
(1989) pointed out that the distortionary impact of taxation is not valid 
8 Despite the fact that Australia does not offer mortgage interest tax relief.
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where credit market restrictions occurred. Although households may want 
to increase their demand for owner-occupied housing to take advantages of 
the tax breaks, the demand does not become effective if credit restrictions 
existed.
However, mortgage markets in the UK began to be liberalised from the early 
eighties onwards. Although, at irst sight, it might be expected that the 
credit rationing literature has become redundant, in fact, the opposite has 
been the case and there has been, in recent years, an increase in interest in 
the impact of credit markets on tenure choice. But there have been two 
major changes. First, the empirical work has been conducted using 
microeconomic data on individual households, rather than aggregate time 
series data. Second, the justiication for the inclusion of credit market 
indicators arises from a new source – the economics of asymmetric 
information. The idea is that lenders, even when they do not face a shortage 
of funds, will typically require a deposit from most households (despite the 
availability of 100 per cent mortgages in some cases). The deposit – so that 
households have an equity stake – attempts to minimise the default risk 
faced by lenders. Notable US work in this area can be found in Haurin et al 
(1994, 1997). Andrew (2005) has conducted similar work on UK data.
In practice, there are a number of reasons why these constraints matter in 
the UK context. First, arguably, at a time of low interest rates, the main 
constraint faced by young potential home-owners is the deposit 
requirement, forcing them to remain longer in private renting. As shown 
above, it is certainly the case that the average age of entry into home-
ownership has risen considerably since 1990 and this may well be one of the 
key factors. But this raises a further question. The increase in private renting 
could be temporary as young households build up their deposits. In a long 
run analysis, the constraints may be less binding. Furthermore, there is some 
evidence that young households are overcoming deposit constraints through 
parental subsidy. If so, credit constraints may be less of an issue. There is also 
evidence in Australia that parental subsidies are increasing. Between 1981 
and 2001, the share of outright owners with heads under 35 increased from 
9 per cent to 13 per cent, although the share of owners with a mortgage fell 
from 47 per cent to 37 per cent. The role of parental contributions in the UK 
can, however, be over-emphasised. Information is typically obtained from 
mortgage lenders, but, by deinition, this includes only households who are 
able to achieve ownership status and, therefore, is a non-random sample. 
The proportion of all new households who receive subsidy is much lower 
and, as already noted, the percentage of young households who have 
become owners in recent years has fallen sharply.
Most modern work on tenure choice uses micro household data. One reason 
is that demand in each tenure varies over the life cycle. Life cycle models 
form the basis for modern work on tenure, although an early example can 
be found in Henderson and Ioannides (1983). Such models recognise that 
the demands for housing by young single-person households with no 
children will differ considerably from older couples with children, in terms of 
location, size and quality. But time-series models can rarely capture these 
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demographic inluences. Having said this, one of the few UK studies, 
Andrew and Meen (2003) inds that, although household formation is very 
sensitive to demographic variables, the choice of tenure is more responsive 
to economic inluences – incomes and relative housing costs – with 
demographics playing a secondary role.9 Nevertheless, the micro approach is 
more robust in tying down the inluence of the demographic variables. The 
models that we set out below use the microeconomic approach and are 
consistent with the household formation equations developed for the earlier 
version of the model.
An additional strand of the literature looks at the effect of transactions costs 
on house purchase. With the exception of on-going work by Mark Andrew, 
this literature is US orientated, e.g. Harman and Potepan (1988), Haurin and 
Gill (2002). A key problem is the period over which transactions costs are 
discounted. For a household that is already credit constrained, transactions 
costs create an additional hurdle for entry into home ownership – the costs 
have to be paid up front. But, for unconstrained households, the costs can 
be spread over the expected length of residence in the dwelling. Therefore, if 
the household expects to live in the house for, say, seven years, it can spread 
the costs, by borrowing, over this period. Wood estimated in the mid-
nineties for Australia that the contribution of transactions costs to the user 
cost of capital fell from 1.6 percentage points at a ive year holding period to 
0.8 percentage points over twenty-ive years. Technically, however, the 
problem is that the expected length of residence is unknown and is 
endogenous. Accounting for transactions costs in this way is dificult, 
although Andrew and White (2006) make an attempt. Given that 
transactions costs appear to be relatively low by international standards in 
the UK (although compiling comparable data is dificult), these are not taken 
into account in the model, although it is recognised that this is a potential 
avenue for further research.
None of the above considers social housing. Movement out of social renting 
can take place by (i) exercising the Right to Buy in situ or (ii) moving to a 
different property in either owner-occupation or the private rental sector (a 
change in tenure choice). Movements into social housing in the framework 
to be explored more fully below arises from a failure to meet the conditions 
to enter ownership (low income, credit constraints), from insuficient income 
to afford the private investment market and from meeting the requirements 
for housing in the social sector. One approach is that the social sector 
becomes the “residual”, given the high proportion of social sector 
households that receive beneit. However, this fails to take account of the 
supply shortages in the social sector. The “residual” approach implicitly 
assumes that social supply is perfectly elastic, which is unlikely to be the case 
except in some predominantly Northern low demand areas. In fact, even in 
low demand regions, the residual approach is unlikely to be adequate. In 
these areas, many households do have a choice between social housing and 
the private rented sector and so the relative price of the two sectors is an 
9 It may be the case that this ranking is primarily relevant for younger households – the focus of most modelling 
work on tenure in the literature. However on-going work by Flatau et al (2006) inds that this is less true for 
middle-aged groups in Australia, because of marriage break up. The same is likely to be true in England.
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additional variable to be taken into account. The responsiveness to relative 
prices would be expected to be higher in regions where shortages are least 
severe i.e. the elasticities are expected to be lower in the southern regions 
than in the northern regions.
In general terms, inclusion of a social sector is still consistent with a tenure 
“choice” or constrained optimisation approach, but the constraints on each 
choice are complex, depending on the nature of credit markets, the tax 
treatment of housing and the available beneits in each tenure. But the 
structure below allows the identiication of lows in to and out of each 
tenure. In principle, tenure choice gives rise to a standard constrained 
optimisation problem, where demand is a function of incomes/wealth and 
relative prices. The main difference from the usual demand system is that 
the dependent variables are discrete and the estimated probabilities sum to 
unity, so that one tenure has to be a residual for the adding up condition 
to hold.
Finally, the model has to take into account Right to Buy sales. In fact, the 
model includes these sales at the aggregate level, rather than looking at the 
individual options to buy of households who are currently in the social 
sector, since there is prima facie evidence that these move in line with the 
housing cycle.
3.2.2 The model structure
Formally, as shown in the left hand column of igure 1, the probability that 
any household, with a given set of characteristics, will be in the three tenures 
in each time period needs to be modelled. Since the model distinguishes 
household types by gender, age of the head, marital status, whether children 
are present and by income, tenure probabilities for all these different groups 
need to be calculated. Having estimated the probabilities, these are then 
multiplied by the number of households in each group to obtain the 
distributions of households by tenure. Calculating the probabilities is clearly 
a key step in the process. The full set of equations can be found in 
appendix 1. The equations are estimated on micro data from the British 
Household Panel Survey.
The model adopts a two stage, hierarchical approach. In the irst stage, 
the probability that each household is an owner or in the rented sector is 
calculated.10 In the second stage, the probabilities of being a private or social 
renter are estimated, conditional on the household being a renter in the 
irst stage. As noted above, these probabilities vary with demographic 
characteristics. But there are four classes of economic variables, which 
have a fundamental inluence:
income•฀
relative housing costs in the tenure•฀
credit restrictions•฀
housing supply constraints•฀
10 An alternative approach would be to specify a top hierarchy in which households choose between market 
and social housing and the market choice is, then, split between owning and private renting.
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All the main factors identiied as being important in the literature review – 
both demographic and economic – are incorporated into the model. 
Unsurprisingly, higher income households have a greater probability of being 
owners. Furthermore, credit constraints are less likely to be binding since 
they will ind it easier to accumulate the required deposit or meet mortgage 
repayments. Similarly, those on low incomes have a higher probability, not 
only of being renters, but also of being in the social sector. Examples are 
presented below.
Relative tenure prices are particularly important. Arguably, the improvements 
in private renting in the mid-nineties means that renting provides a closer 
substitute to ownership in terms of housing quality; therefore we would 
expect that tenure choices should become more sensitive to the relative 
costs. This turns out to be the case, although there are conceptual and 
practical dificulties in measuring the costs. Conceptually the deinitions of 
private and social sector rents are relatively straightforward, but problems 
arise from the absence of historical runs of data. In practice, we can use rent 
data published by Communities and Local Government, varying by region or 
recorded rents in the BHPS. One of the problems is that rent is endogenous 
in the sense that low income households may pay a reduced or zero rent, 
because of housing beneits. Therefore, rents are individual speciic. It is 
feasible to use BHPS rental data for those who are currently renters, but we 
also need the implicit rental for those who are currently owners, which is, of 
course, not observed. This is necessary in order to calculate relative tenure 
prices for owners. The model uses Communities and Local Government 
measures of regional average rents in the private and public sectors. This 
implies that owners would not be eligible for beneits were they to switch to 
renting. An alternative would have been to estimate, by regression, the 
expected rent that a current owner would face in the social and private 
sectors, given the household’s characteristics, including income, from the 
BHPS data. Wood et al (2006) use a related approach for Australia in which 
they estimate a rent equation used to predict the rent that would be paid if 
owners rented. They then impute eligibility for public assistance to arrive at 
the net rent.
More dificult conceptually is the measurement of owner-occupier housing 
costs. The literature is clear that this should be the housing user cost of 
capital – the real per period unit cost of owner-occupier housing services.11 
A simple version is given as (4) to demonstrate the issues:
 (4)
where:
i = the nominal mortgage interest rate
t = tax advantages to owner-occupation
PH = nominal house prices
P = general price level
δ = depreciation rate
MN = maintenance expenditures (as % of property value)
11 This can also be used in the model as an additional indicator of affordability.
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CT = property taxes (as % of property value)
T = transactions costs (as % of property value)
(e) = superscript represents an expected value
(.) = represents the rate of change of a variable
In previous work, we have found that capital gains – an element of the user 
cost – have had a less than proportionate effect in (4), which implies that 
nominal interest rates have an additional effect to real interest rates. To see 
this rewrite equation (4) as (4’):
 (4’)
Now in (4), the capital gains term has an implicit weight of one (or α = 1 in 
(4’)). But our empirical work suggests that the coeficient is much less than 
one. Indeed, in recent years, we cannot reject a value of zero. On the one 
hand, at a value of zero, (4’) implies that only nominal interest rates affect 
demand (consistent with front end loading), since the capital gains element 
drops out of the expression. On the other hand, at a value of unity, only real 
rates matter and, at intermediate values, both real and nominal rates matter. 
The model uses a data-determined coeficient value of zero, suggesting that 
front end loading issues have been the most important in recent years, but it 
has to be recognised that a case can be made for using (4) in a long-run 
model, despite what the data may say in the short term.
The deinition also highlights two dificult modelling problems. First, the user 
cost includes transactions costs. As noted above, for those facing binding 
credit restrictions, the term is the cost of stamp duty, solicitors fees etc, but 
for those who are unconstrained, the costs are spread over time according to 
the expected length of residence. But, as noted above, transactions costs are 
ignored in the model at the current time.
But the more important issue concerns credit constraints. The existence of a 
credit market constraint, in effect, raises the user cost of capital. Therefore, 
the constraints modify the prices in the tenure. But the constraint has to be 
operationalised. US work, followed by Andrew (2005) for the UK 
concentrates on two potential constraints – an income multiple constraint, 
which relects repayments for a given level of interest rates, and a wealth 
constraint, necessary for the raising of the initial deposit. None, one or both 
constraints may be binding. For example, at a time of low nominal interest 
rates, the importance of an income constraint may be limited, but as house 
prices rise, the ability to meet the deposit becomes more dificult, without 
relying on family and friends. Benito (2006) argues that the deposit 
constraint is important in explaining variations in the response of house price 
inlation to shocks in the UK. Wood et al (2006) also ind that in Australia 
between 1996 and 2003, the deposit constraint was much more important 
than the income constraint. The empirical results from the model ind that 
the constraints are only potentially binding for the under 40 age group. At 
least historically, the older age groups appear to have accumulated suficient 
assets by that stage of their life cycles. However, it has to be recognised that 
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this may not hold in the future and binding credit constraints could be a 
feature that extend further into housing careers.
In Andrew (2005), the model includes dummy variables for each individual 
according to whether each constraint is binding or not. Although there are 
no major data problems associated with the income multiple constraint, the 
deposit constraint requires information on wealth; direct information is 
available only in two waves of the BHPS and therefore has to be indirectly 
imputed since more waves are used in estimation.
One of the important features of such constraints is that they do not 
necessarily provide a permanent hurdle to home ownership; rather they 
delay entry until the household can accumulate suficient resources, through 
saving, to meet the deposit requirement. The simulations in chapter 5 show 
the importance of the constraints in practice.
A further issue is the relationship between rents and ownership costs. Since 
this is a general equilibrium model, both have to be determined within the 
model. One solution to the problem can be found in Wood et al (2006). 
Their model deines both a reservation rent for landlords and a bid rent for 
potential tenants in Australia. The two are not necessarily equal because of 
different tax provisions facing landlords and tenants and also because the 
two groups may be at different points of the income distribution and 
therefore have different marginal income tax rates. Households decide 
between owning and renting according to whether their bid rent is greater 
than the reservation rent, although the decision is affected by deposit and 
repayment costs in the same manner as above. However, this approach 
requires detailed information on landlords – taken from a rental survey in 
Australia – which is not available for England.
Furthermore, our work suggests that tenure is sensitive to differences in 
relative tenure costs. Therefore, in models that are simulated over the long 
run (the model is projected to 2031), relative prices have to be tied together 
or, eventually, all households may be in the same tenure without some other 
equilibrating mechanism. Since, under these conditions, the credit 
constraints are likely to become more or less binding, they are likely to be a 
part of this mechanism. The model imposes a simple form of the arbitrage 
relationship, which is broadly consistent with the Wood et al approach 
without the details of the tax system. In equilibrium, this gives (5), using 
equation (4).
 (5)
Since nominal house prices (PH) are already determined in the model and for 
given values of the variables in [.], the private sector rent (R
pr
) is determined. 
Public sector rents (R
soc
) are administered rather than market determined, but 
a simple relationship is added in order to keep gross social sector rents in line 
with the private sector, (6). (γ ) represents the ixed differential between real 
public and private rents. Again, failure to include an equation may distort 
tenure choices.
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 (6)
Finally there is nothing in the above to relect the possibility of supply 
shortages in the tenures. These issues become particularly important in 
chapter 4, but it is possible, for example, that demand for social housing will 
exceed supply for a given set of relative prices. If this occurs, the model 
assumes that the excess is housed in private renting.
3.3 Empirical results
The empirical results of the tenure choice models for the three age groups 
20-39, 40-59, 60+ can be found in appendix 1. Each equation is estimated 
across the BHPS waves from 1991 to 2002, although the irst wave is used 
to construct the lags. Formally, the presented results refer to a probit model 
with sample selection, where the income variable is instrumented for 
potential endogeneity. Fixed effects versions were also estimated to allow for 
possible omitted time constant household characteristics. The bottom halves 
of the tables set out the factors that determine the probability of not being 
an owner and the top halves model the probability of being in the private 
rental sector, conditional on not being an owner. Data are insuficient (with 
an important exception) to model separate equations for each region and, 
therefore, regional dummies are included. The choice of variables is a 
mixture of demographic and economic and is designed to it in with the rest 
of the affordability model. The included variables are also similar to those in 
Andrew and Meen (2003). Note that inertia is an important part of 
behaviour. Therefore, one of the most important determinants of current 
tenure is last year’s tenure. Households, typically, do not respond 
immediately to changes in economic or demographic factors.
3.3.1 Ownership demand
The same speciication is employed for each of the three age groups. 
However the literature implies that coeficients for the under 40 age group 
are expected to be the most precisely deined. Beyond the age of 40 tenure 
patterns tend to be more ixed and it might be expected that choice would 
be less dependent on economic variables, although tenure change would 
still be affected by family break up, for example. As noted above, the 
equations for the two older age groups exclude the credit constraints, which 
were found to be insigniicant in the 40-59 age group equation. However, 
this may well change in the future.
Appendix 1.1 indicates that all the key variables in the 20-39 age group 
equation are signiicant. At irst sight, income appears to be insigniicant. 
However income also enters through the income multiples term (one of the 
credit constraints), which is signiicant. Arguably, there is no need to include 
a separate income term once the credit restriction is added. Notice also that 
the under 40 equation does not include an age indicator. Given the increase 
in the average age of entry to ownership, this might, at irst sight, be 
considered surprising. However, age is, in principle, again captured through 
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the credit restrictions, since the ability to accumulate a deposit is positively 
related to age. Therefore, the assumption of the model is that the delayed 
entry is a function of economic inluences, and is not related to age per se. 
Both marriage and cohabitation increase the probability of ownership, 
although those in the latter state have a lower probability than the former. 
Having children lowers the probability of ownership, conditional on the 
other variables. The high costs of having children are well known. This also 
relects the fact that single parents with children receive higher priority in 
social housing. For the under 40s, male heads have a higher ownership 
probability.
The most controversial elements of the equation, however, are the coeficients 
on the housing user cost and rental terms. Although the coeficients are highly 
signiicant for all three age groups, in no case could the restriction that the 
coeficients are equal and opposite in sign be imposed. Since we expect the 
relative price to be the appropriate variable, this is disappointing. Furthermore, 
in a long-run model, this causes dificulty in simulation. Although not entirely 
satisfactory, the simulation model imposes the theoretical restriction, which is 
not accepted by the data, that the coeficients are equal, imposing the 
average of the two cost coeficients.12
A second feature of the cost terms concerns the deinition of the user cost. 
In contrast to equation (4), the variables include no capital gains element. 
Inclusion of capital gains was heavily rejected by the data. In fact, this is 
consistent with the macroeconomic evidence. Meen and Andrew (1998) 
suggest that the implicit coeficient on capital gains in the user cost was 0.3 
(rather than one) between 1969 and 1996. As noted above, this implies that 
nominal interest rates as well as real rates affect behaviour. More recent 
work (Meen 2007), extending the estimation period to 2005, inds that the 
capital gains coeficient has fallen even further. In other words, nominal rates 
have become even more important recently. This is consistent with the 
impact of front-end loading. There is a question, however, in a long-run 
model, whether a capital gains effect should be imposed in line with theory, 
despite the empirical evidence. We have chosen not to do so.
We might expect the coeficients to be less well deined in the post 40 
age group equations. Indeed, in general, the coeficients are slightly less 
signiicant. However, there are surprises. First, the income coeficients are 
larger for the older age groups. But, as already argued, this is to be expected 
if the younger age groups face credit restrictions – the implicit coeficient is 
much larger than the coeficient on the household income coeficient alone. 
The older age groups have no credit restriction terms. More dificult to justify 
is the very large income coeficient for the over 60 group. The coeficient is 
four times greater than for the 40-59 group. Despite the fact that the term is 
highly signiicant, estimating adequate relationships for the older age group 
is dificult and the simulation model restricts the coeficient to be equal to 
–0.01, i.e. similar to that for the 40-59 group.13 For the same reason, the 
12 As a result, an adjustment also has to be made to the constant for scaling.
13 The restriction is only imposed for those who were not owners in the previous wave. Since those who were 
previous owners have a probability close to one, the income term has only a small effect and the restriction 
is unnecessary.
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relative cost coeficients for the 60+ group appear high and have been 
restricted to values of 0.4. The effect of the restrictions is to reduce the 
sensitivity of the ownership probabilities to economic inluences for the 
over 60s.
3.3.2 Renting demand
The choice between private and social renting is also related to demographic 
and economic variables. The speciication attempts to capture the fact that 
entry to the social sector is partly administered, with potential entrants 
needing to meet certain criteria, but households also have some choice 
based on relative costs, particularly in regions that do not suffer excess 
demand. A relatively simple speciication cannot hope to capture the full 
complexities of an administered system, but, nevertheless, the results appear 
to possess some of the expected features. For example, those with children 
and those on low incomes are more likely to be in the social sector. This is 
true across each of the three age groups. There is, again, a high degree of 
persistence between the two rented sectors. Those already in social housing 
do not quickly move out even if their incomes rise. The persistence is greater 
for the older age groups.
As expected, relative costs are only signiicant for the 20-39 age group. 
In fact, the equation allows differential effects between the four southern 
regions and the rest of the country. More precisely, since access to social 
housing is more constrained in the South, we expect the relative price 
coeficients to be smaller. To capture this, two relative price terms are 
included; the irst relrsrs applies to all regions, whereas the effect for the 
southern regions is the sum of the coeficients on relrsrs and 
SOUTHRELRSRS, i.e. 0.563-0.446 = 0.117. Note also that in the renting 
equation, the restriction that the coeficients on private and social rents are 
equal can be accepted by the data.
3.4 Key properties and implications
Full simulations on the model are carried out in chapter 5. But here, some of 
the properties of the equations are illustrated, which are not immediately 
clear from the estimated equations alone. Two features are illustrated:
the variations in ownership and renting probabilities between different (i) 
types of households and income groups
the importance of the credit market variables(ii) 
Neither of these can be read directly from the equations in Appendix 1. 
Tenure probabilities are distinguished by:
gender of the household head•฀
age (ive year age bands from the ages 16-39 plus 40-59 and 60+)•฀
whether the household has children•฀
marital status (single or married/cohabiting)•฀
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household income quartile•฀
tenure in the previous year•฀
Table 5 provides a small illustrative set of the ownership probabilities from 
the very large number calculated in the full affordability model. Table 6 
provides similar information for the social renters. In other words, the 
estimates are the renting probabilities conditional on not being an owner in 
the current period.
Table 5: Ownership Probabilities for Previous Renters and Previous Owners 
(South East, 2003)
Female Head, Aged 30-34, Single, No Children
Previous Owner Previous Renter
Income Quartile 2 0.936 0.023
Income Quartile 4 0.961 0.040
Male Head, Aged 35-39, Partner, With Children
Previous Owner Previous Renter
Income Quartile 2 0.982 0.078
Income Quartile 4 0.991 0.120
Table 6: Social Renting Probabilities for Previous Social Renters and 
Non-Previous Social Renters (South East, 2003)
Female Head, Aged 30-34, Single, No Children
Previous 
Social Renter
Not Previous 
Social Renter
Income Quartile 1 0.899 0.167
Income Quartile 4 0.473 0.010
Male Head, Aged 35-39, Partner, With Children
Previous Social Renter Not Previous 
Social Renter
Income Quartile 1 0.980 0.428
Income Quartile 4 0.763 0.064
Table 5 demonstrates the importance of previous tenure. For all chosen 
household types, the probability of home ownership in the current year for 
those who were owners last year is well over 90 per cent. Tenure transitions, 
typically, do not take place rapidly. For previous renters, the one year 
transitions to ownership are fairly low, although they do differ noticeably 
between household types and income quartiles. Of course, this does not 
mean that these households will never enter ownership; rather the 
transitions are low in any one year.
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Similarly, table 6 shows the importance of income to the probability of being 
in social housing. The probabilities fall sharply in the higher income quartiles 
for all household types.
In order to provide a feel for the importance of the deposit constraint and 
how it varies across regions, it is possible to calculate the irst year in which 
the constraint ceases to bind for different types of households (here, chosen 
to be a married male aged 30-34) at each quartile in the income distribution. 
Results are shown in table 7, although it should be borne in mind that the 
results are illustrative and depend on the baseline projections from which 
they are run. Higher house prices than in the base, for example, would 
delay entry into ownership further.
Table 7: Years in which the Deposit Constraint Ceases to Bind 
(Male, 30-34, partner and children)
Region Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
London – – 2025 2016
South East – – 2019 2012
East – – 2016 2011
South West – – 2017 2011
East Midlands – 2018 2011 2008
West Midlands – 2021 2011 2009
Yorkshire and 
Humberside
– 2014 2009 2007
North West – 2014 2009 2007
North East 2017 2010 2007 2005
The table suggests that, except in the North East, the deposit constraint is 
binding in all years for the lowest quartile. In the southern regions, the year 
at which the constraint no longer binds is well into the future even for 
households in the third quartile. Importantly, note that the igures do not 
imply that the probability of ownership falls to zero in the presence of the 
constraint. Rather the probability falls and owners would have to buy a 
lower value property than they desire. As an illustration, in 2018, the 
estimated probability of ownership for a household in the South East with 
the characteristics in table 7 and with an income at the third quartile is 0.13. 
This jumps to 0.29 when the constraint no longer binds in 2019. Hence, as 
the literature indicates, housing consumption patterns are not smooth and 
households have to “jump” the hurdle.
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Chapter 4: Long-run 
equilibrium
This chapter considers the manner in which housing markets adjust in 
response to increases in housing supply. Clearly, one of the most important 
mechanisms is through a change in house prices and, consequently, through 
an improvement in affordability. The irst report concentrated on this aspect. 
But prices do not clear housing markets immediately; markets can remain 
in disequilibrium for considerable periods of time. In this case, forms of 
quantity adjustment (to be deined below) take place as well. Furthermore, 
it is arguable that, because of historical housing supply shortages, some 
quantity variables have been permanently below their long-run equilibrium 
values, notably vacancies and demolitions. Therefore, if higher levels of new 
construction occur in the future, then vacancies and demolitions become 
part of the long-run adjustment process in addition to prices. This chapter is 
concerned with the determination of the long-run equilibrium structure of 
the affordability model. As a part of this, the model has to move away from 
the traditional planning assumption that all housing units are treated equally. 
Instead the model needs to take account of the fact that different types of 
dwellings contain different quantities of services. This leads to a process of 
iltering of the housing stock and provides an approach to the question 
raised in the Introduction, who will live in the extra homes? It is, however, 
important to note that this question arose from the suggestion that there 
would be an excess of dwellings over expected household formation if 
housing construction was increased signiicantly in order to improve 
affordability. The model does not attempt to answer the more dificult, but 
interesting question of which types of households would occupy the new 
housing. To approach this issue would require a detailed analysis of housing 
sub-markets identiied both spatially and by dwelling/household types. 
Regional models are not well-suited to answering such questions.
The nature of the required adjustment is also highlighted in the conventional 
relationship (7), which relates the number of households to the number of 
housing units. It is important to stress that the relationship here is 
determined in terms of units rather than housing services, which were the 
focus of attention in chapter 2. However, we demonstrate below that the 
distinction between services and units is important to the model in the 
determination of demolitions. (7) lies behind the conventional planning view 
that changes in net additions to the housing stock have to match the 
expected increase in the number of households (taken from oficial 
household projections). However, it was shown in chapter 2 that this rule is 
insuficient to ensure stability in housing affordability. Typically, affordability 
will worsen over time.
 (7)
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HH = number of households
HS = number of new housing units
SEC = second homes
VAC = vacancies
CONV = net gains from conversions and changes in property use
DEM = demolitions
SHARE =  sharing households – the number of dwellings shared (excess 
sharing households)
But more generally, in response to supply shocks, notably an increase in new 
housing supply (DHS), adjustment to a new equilibrium under (7) can take 
place through a combination of any of these quantity variables as well as 
through prices. Therefore, a well-deined model equilibrium should be based 
on the equilibrium to all these variables. In fact, the irst report showed that 
only a proportion of the adjustment occurs through an increase in the 
number of new households (approximately a third). In other words, an 
increase in new housing construction is not usually matched by a 
corresponding increase in new households in any region.14 Therefore, for 
equilibrium, second homes, vacancies, conversions, demolitions or sharing 
must adjust. It has been argued that, historically, vacancies and demolitions 
have not fulilled this role. For example, demolitions have been low since the 
ending of the major slum clearance programmes that took place between 
the ifties and seventies (igure 6). Similarly, vacancies appear to have been 
low by international standards. However, there are two weaknesses in this 
argument. First, historical levels of demolitions and vacancies relect past 
housing market shortages. Where house prices are high, the opportunity 
cost of holding homes empty is also high. Similarly the expected life of a 
dwelling rises, reducing demolitions. Under a system that improves 
affordability and relects the market, both vacancies and demolitions would 
be expected to be higher than in the past. Second, although (7) must hold, 
it is insuficient since it is deined in terms of units rather than relecting 
differences in the quantity of housing services within each unit. As we 
stressed in chapter 2, typically a four bedroom house contains more 
services than a two room lat, but (7) does not take that into account.
The modelling in this chapter is designed to ensure (7) holds, but also relects 
housing quality. Therefore, the sections consider the variables in equation 
(7), although the determination of the number of households (HH) is not 
discussed since this is covered in earlier reports (see ODPM 2005, Meen and 
Andrew 2007). Furthermore, since they play only a small role in the 
adjustment process in the simulations in chapter 5, conversions and changes 
in use are not discussed in detail. This allows the paper to concentrate on 
the central roles of vacancies and demolitions. In fact, long time series of 
data on conversions and changes in use are not available at a regional scale. 
Consequently, the model contains simple iterating relationships, estimated 
across a regional panel, where conversions are related to real house prices 
14 There are, however, exceptions. In “unbalanced” increases in construction, migration lows may induce equal 
increases in the number of households (see the irst report).
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and changes in use are related to house prices relative to commercial 
property returns.15
Figure 6: Total Houses Demolished or Closed Under Slum Clearance (Nos. 
England and Wales)
(igures for 1974 onwards relate to inancial years)
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Source: Housing Statistics (various years)
4.1 Modelling demolitions
One of the problems in modelling demolitions in England is that the quantity 
and quality of past data are limited, relecting the low historical levels. 
Furthermore, since the data relect past housing shortages, they may not be 
relevant to a world in which construction levels are higher. Consequently, 
standard empirical models estimated on past data are unlikely to be relevant 
and the analysis has to return to irst principles. Analogies can be drawn 
from the commercial property literature and then the differences that arise in 
residential markets highlighted.
4.1.1 Commercial property, obsolescence and demolitions16
At any time the value of a building depends on its ability to generate income 
and the level of its maintenance and running costs. Over time the value of a 
building will normally fall as its income potential declines because it becomes 
less suitable for modern use as technology changes and its operating and 
maintenance costs increase. Redevelopment is viable when the net present 
value of a redevelopment scheme, including the value of the buildings 
created and the costs of demolition and construction, exceeds the net 
present value of the existing use. This condition identiies the date at which 
an existing building becomes economically obsolete. In fact, existing 
buildings may become physically obsolete, i.e. operating costs exceed 
revenue, before there is a proitable new use to replace them – the 
15 There is also no time-series information available on changes in excess sharing and this element becomes, 
in effect, the residual in the system.
16 Parts of this sub-section rely on work by Eamonn D’Arcy.
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implication of this is that land values are negative once the costs of site 
clearance and reconstruction are taken into account. The site may remain 
derelict and vacant until new opportunities become available.
In Britain there are many examples of economic obsolescence within 25 
years in the ofice market where 1960s ofices were unsuited to modern 
ofice technology. In extreme cases new developments have become 
economically obsolete on or before completion in some industrial 
developments in the London Docklands.
External (social) costs and beneits also inluence the socially optimal timing 
of development. Where the beneits are positive, the expected life of the 
building is prolonged and redevelopment postponed. This situation may 
arise, for example, in the context of buildings which have either historic 
importance or architectural merit. Equally, the social costs of existing 
buildings may be so high, that the socially optimal redevelopment period 
may be brought forward. For example, high levels of crime in the most 
deprived areas might advance the case for slum clearance.
The question therefore arises why housing markets do not appear to operate 
in the same way in England. There is some evidence that housing markets in 
the US do follow these principles approximately. Houses should become 
physically obsolete when (imputed or market) rents are exceeded by 
maintenance expenditures. Furthermore, under economic obsolescence, 
houses should be demolished and replaced when the net present value of 
the rental stream is lower than under an alternative use.
These conditions incorporate the effects of technological change. In 
commercial markets, the rents of buildings that are unit for modern 
purposes will fall, leading to faster rates of demolition. In principle, dwellings 
can also become unit for modern styles of living (see Kintrea (2005)), leading 
to lower prices. Arguably, this is one reason why dockland developments in 
major cities are popular amongst young, high income households without 
children – they suit the modern lifestyle of this socio-economic group.
Although comparisons are dificult, it appears to be the case that the lives of 
residential properties are longer than for commercial properties. Furthermore 
English dwellings are noticeably older than in the US, for example table 8 
sets out the distribution of the age of the housing stock in England. 
Approximately 40 per cent of the stock was built prior to the Second World 
War and the privately rented stock is noticeably older. By contrast, social 
housing is typically newer as a result of post-war building programmes. 
Age is, of course, an imperfect proxy for quality and the very oldest 
buildings take on historic importance. By contrast, as table 9 shows, less 
than 20 per cent of the US stock was built prior to the war.
A number of structural differences between housing and commercial 
markets might be identiied that contribute to extending the life of existing 
dwellings beyond that typically found for ofices. In general, these relate to 
forms of market failure arising from controls or externalities. International 
differences in these factors add to variations in the ages of housing stocks.
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Table 8: Age Distribution of the English Housing Stock (%)
All households
Year Built
Tenure Before 
1800
1800- 
1850
1851- 
1900
1901- 
1918
1919- 
1930
1931- 
1945
1946- 
1964
1965- 
1980
1981- 
1984
1985 
or 
later
All owners 2 2 8 7 6 14 20 21 5 14
All social 
sector tenants
0 0 2 3 4 12 32 27 7 12
All rented 
privately
4 3 15 15 8 10 13 13 5 14
All tenures 2 2 8 8 6 13 22 21 5 14
Source: Survey of English Housing 2004/2005
Table 9: Age Distribution of the US Housing Stock (%)
%
Before 1920 8.0
1920-29 4.5
1930-39 5.3
1940-49 6.7
1950-59 11.1
1960-69 12.8
1970-74 9.3
1975-79 10.2
1980-84 6.3
1985-89 7.3
1990-94 5.9
1995-99 7.3
2000-04 5.2
Total 100.0
Source: American Housing Survey 2003, Table 1A-1
Redevelopment of residential sites differs from commercial projects, because 
of the absence of concentration of property rights, particularly in the owner-
occupier sector. A hectare of land, for example, might have 25 different 
owners at the average density. The diversity of property rights, the 
consequent dificulty of assembling large land packages and arguments over 
compensation have hampered slum clearance programmes since at least the 
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19th century. Property rights can be seen as a form of transaction cost 
(see Webster and Wai-Chung Lai 2003), therefore lengthening the time 
to redevelopment.
Land use controls, zoning, and building regulations may all prevent 
redevelopment schemes from occurring at the optimal time. There are two 
reasons why these might be stronger for housing than for commercial 
development. First, local authorities might be keener to attract jobs than the 
associated residential development necessary to house the extra workers. 
Therefore, industrial controls tend to be weaker than on residential 
developments. Second, building codes and minimum housing standards may 
prevent the iltering of the housing stock from working in the manner 
predicted by theory. Evidence for this in the US is discussed in the next 
sub-section.
Externalities and the possible social value of buildings are discussed above. 
Both residential and industrial buildings may exhibit architectural merit and 
might be listed. But whether this is likely to be more of a signiicant factor 
for houses than industrial or commercial development is unclear. However, 
attachment to place is more important for households. There is strong 
evidence that households move only short distances in order to preserve ties 
with families and friends. Arguably, they also have an attachment to their 
dwelling since houses in different locations are imperfect substitutes. But the 
attachment will not be relected in market values since the externality is 
household-speciic. Consequently, we might expect to observe a higher level 
of improvements to existing dwellings rather than demolitions and 
redevelopment. In Britain in 2005, new private sector housing construction 
and repair, maintenance and improvement expenditures were approximately 
equal.
4.1.2 What does the literature say?
In their model of “tear downs” in the Chicago market, Dye and McMillen 
(2007) argue that homes selected for demolition are far from random. 
Developers seek “older, smaller homes on large lots to replace with new 
houses built to the limits of local building codes and zoning regulations”. 
Anecdotally, in-ill building in the UK often appears to entail the demolition 
of older homes on larger sites. Dye and McMillen also ind that older, 
cheaper homes in the midst of high-demand areas are more likely to be 
cleared. All of these indings are consistent with the standard life-cycle 
model, allowing for the special conditions of the housing market.
These observations suggest that any model of housing demolitions has to be 
tied up with dynamic theories of urban change. Issues of demolitions, 
conversions and vacancies are all part of the same general process of urban 
dynamics. Models of iltering and models that stress the ageing of the 
housing stock provide valuable insights.
The seminal work of Grigsby (1963) and Grigsby et al (1987) provides the 
natural starting point for models of iltering (see Megbolugbe et al (1996) 
and Galster (1996) for summaries of the importance of Grigsby’s work). 
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Although a number of related approaches have been employed, iltering can 
be deined as “the process by which dwellings descend over time from 
higher to lower income households”. An important feature of this process is 
that sub-standard housing in the most deprived areas is not an inevitable 
outcome of physical depreciation. The stock can be maintained almost 
indeinitely if the incentives are suficiently strong for the required 
maintenance expenditures to be undertaken. Rather, in line with the models 
above, deterioration is the outcome of an economic decision not to 
undertake the maintenance. This decision, in turn, depends on relative shifts 
in demand and supply, not only for individual properties, but also for the 
neighbourhood since the neighbourhood provides an externality. Although 
much of Grigsby’s work was concerned with neighbourhood decline – the 
best quality and newest housing originally built for higher income groups 
eventually moves downmarket – shifts in demand may also cause upward 
price pressures, leading to gentriication.
Filtering is, in principle, consistent with the implicit assumptions of the 
affordability model. However the evidence is not clear cut that iltering, in 
practice, works eficiently. US work by Malpezzi and Green (1996) inds that 
iltering appears to operate, but its progress may be impeded by land-use 
controls. Although housing quality for low income households has improved 
over time, they are required to devote higher shares of their incomes to 
housing. The increase might relect the desires of households, but, 
alternatively, could also relect a form of market failure. Building code 
regulations, for example, truncate the iltering process, since quality is not 
allowed to fall below a certain level. The authors show that the supply of 
low income housing has fallen in the US and the relative price risen, 
consistent with the effect of controls. Furthermore, they demonstrate that a 
city that makes it easier for any type of housing to be built will enhance the 
stock of low-cost housing. But restrictions on any kind of housing (including 
high quality housing) will restrict the available stock of low-cost dwellings.
Ageing obviously plays an important role in iltering models, but models 
from a different tradition also stress the idea that high income households 
prefer to live in newer dwellings, at least in the US. This is less clearly the 
case in the UK, but these models are used to explain gentriication. A recent 
example is the work of Brueckner and Rosenthal (2005), who argue that 
newer dwellings yield higher housing services. Traditionally, these have been 
in the suburbs as development proceeds outwards from the city centre. But, 
subsequently, when the urban core is redeveloped, higher income 
households prefer to return to the centre since the housing stock will be 
younger and of higher quality and access to the centre is improved. 
Therefore gentriication takes place. Consequently, the model, places the 
age of the dwelling stock as the key driver of neighbourhood dynamics. 
Further support for the role of the age of the dwelling stock in renovation 
and gentriication is provided in Helms (2003), who estimates models of 
renovation expenditures in Chicago. Although age remains a key driver, he 
inds that both individual and neighbourhood characteristics are important.
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There is empirical evidence from the US literature to support the view that 
redevelopment occurs when the price of land for new development exceeds 
the price of land in its current use by the cost of demolition. In most 
applications, demolition costs are considered small and are ignored.17 In this 
ield, the appropriate rule was originally developed in Brueckner (1980) and 
Wheaton (1982). But the irst rigorous tests appear in Rosenthal and Helsley 
(1994). Subsequent to Rosenthal and Helsley’s work on Vancouver housing 
markets, Munneke (1996) applied the same model to industrial and 
commercial development in Chicago. Dye and McMillen (2007) extend the 
model in the Chicago metropolitan housing market. McGrath (2000) adjusts 
the model to allow for contamination risk in industrial developments, again 
in Chicago. But all these studies ind support for the valuation rule.
The problem, however, is that the methods of these studies cannot be used 
directly in England. The tests in all the studies are based on micro data sets 
for properties recently sold that explicitly identify whether the properties are 
to be developed or not. No such data sets exist in England.
4.1.3 Data on demolitions in England
Early data, shown in igure 6, concentrated on demolitions under slum 
clearance programmes. But these, of course, do not arise from market-driven 
decisions. The sharp increase in demolitions in the sixties and seventies is 
immediately evident, peaking at approximately 70,000 dwellings per annum. 
But slum clearances are only part of the total. During the current decade 
total demolitions have averaged approximately 22,000 units per annum. In 
2005/06, this amounted to 0.9 per cent of the housing stock. Also, the 
numbers have increased since the early nineties, when demolitions were 
approximately 8,000 per annum. Most of these demolitions will have been in 
the social sector, though even the majority of private sector demolitions are 
likely to be due to government sponsored initiatives.
4.1.4 Introducing housing quality
As noted above, past data provide little guide to the expected level of 
demolitions in a market-based system, if housing supply shortages are less 
evident. But it is precisely this scenario that the affordability model is required 
to analyse. Therefore, from sections 4.1.1-4.1.3, an alternative approach is to 
consider which properties are most likely to be demolished if all the remaining 
variables in equation (7) are at their equilibrium values. These values are 
considered in later sections, but the fundamental problem is to provide a link 
between the number of demolitions measured in units (necessary for equation 
7 to hold) and the implied reduction in housing services arising from these 
demolitions. This, in turn, affects the level of house prices in the model.
From the iltering and valuation models, the dwellings most likely to face 
demolition are those that have the lowest market values relative to the value 
of a comparable new property. The values of these dwellings tend towards 
the underlying land value. If new properties contain the highest levels of 
17 Rosenthal and Helsley (1994) ind that demolition costs in Vancouver are only 1.7 per cent of the average price 
of redeveloped properties, although costs can clearly be much higher where land is contaminated (McGrath 
2000).
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housing services and depreciation of older dwellings is straight line (Brueckner 
and Rosenthal 2005), it is possible to deine the point of economic 
obsolescence, when demolition occurs. But, in Britain, straight line 
depreciation is probably not a reasonable approximation. Older Victorian 
dwellings in cities may well yield higher services than properties constructed 
in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly since only the best parts of the Victorian 
housing stock will have survived until today. Furthermore, given regular 
renovation of the stock, only the shell of the dwelling may be truly Victorian. 
Therefore, estimating which properties are the prime candidates for 
demolition becomes more complex and requires the model to consider 
explicitly housing quality and the quantity of housing services contained 
within different units of the dwelling stock. Returning to equation (7), each 
unit is no longer treated as identical and the standard approach of matching 
numbers of households to numbers of dwelling units is no longer suficient. It 
is useful to introduce the concept of an effective housing stock, where each 
unit is weighted by the implied volume of housing services. In principle, 
estimates of the weights can be obtained by hedonic analysis, using data on 
house prices and dwelling characteristics, taken from the Survey of Mortgage 
Lenders (SML). From the hedonic equations it is possible to obtain an 
estimate of the relationship between house prices and property age, which, 
in turn, generates the deprecation rates. In practice, however, the main 
constraint is that the SML has information only on a limited range of dwelling 
characteristics. Therefore, property age may be picking up the effects of other 
omitted variables, which are correlated with the age of the property.
Nevertheless, the hedonic equations are estimated on pooled data covering 
the years 1997, 1999 and 2001. The SML did not include data on age after 
this date. Pooling requires the inclusion of year dummy variables (YR1999, 
YR2001). 1997 is the default year. The hedonic equation takes the form of 
(8). The SML identiies the following categories for the ages of dwellings:
new•฀
built post 1980•฀
built 1960-1980•฀
built 1940-1960•฀
built 1919-1939•฀
built pre-1919•฀
In addition the SML includes information on the type of property (detached, 
semi, terraced, lats), the number of rooms, which acts as a proxy for the 
size of the dwelling, and location down to local authority level. Flats built 
before 1919 were used as the reference category. As noted above, this is a 
limited speciication relative to the large numbers of variables typically 
included in hedonic equations. From the perspective of the model, the main 
omissions are any direct indicators of property size or neighbourhood quality.
The results are shown in table 2.1 in appendix 2.18
18 The model also tested interactions between the variables in equation (8). These do not change the conclusions 
and are not presented here.
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 (8)
PH
j
 = House sale price
Size = Size of property measured in the number of rooms
Type =  Dummies for the type of property (detached, semidetached, 
terraced, etc)
Age = Dummies for the time period when the property was built
LA = Dummies for the local authority in the region
YR = Year dummy
ε = error term
j = denotes a region
The coeficients on the Age variables provide an estimate of annual 
depreciation rates, varying by region and by property type. The results in 
appendix 2 show a considerable degree of consistency across the regions. 
For example, an additional room adds approximately 12 per cent to the 
property value in all regions. One of the main differences, however, is that 
terraced properties attract a premium (over lats) in London, the South East 
and East, but receive a lower price in the northern regions, notably the North 
West, where terraced prices of a given vintage and size are 20 per cent 
lower than the price of lats. New properties in all regions attract a premium. 
One of the most striking features of the London results is the U-shaped 
relationship between price and property ages, see igure (7). Properties built 
between 1950 and 1980 are 30 per cent below those of pre-1919 
properties. This appears to relect the attractiveness of pre-1919 (terraced) 
properties built in London, which typically have undergone substantial 
renovation. The U-shape depreciation curve is less pronounced in the other 
regions, although it still exists. Straight line depreciation does not appear to 
be an appropriate assumption in England. However, although the equations 
are well-determined statistically and the results appear intuitively plausible, 
the health warning from above should be emphasised. It is possible 
(although not testable on the SML data set) that the age indicators are partly 
capturing omitted other factors, such as property size.
For the affordability model as a whole, the most important conclusion from 
the equations is that, in all regions, post-war properties have the lowest 
price relative to newly-built properties of comparable types, not the oldest 
Victorian and Edwardian dwellings. In terms of market adjustment, the 
post-war dwellings are the more likely candidates for demolition. In the 
model, if demolitions are required, this vintage of dwellings is assumed to be 
demolished irst.
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Figure 7: The Relationship between House Prices and Age
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The measure of the effective housing stock follows from the hedonic 
equations. As noted above, there are no oficial estimates of the stock of 
housing services that can be used in time-series estimates of house price 
equations instead of the number of units. Consequently, applications of the 
standard life-cycle housing model generally use the simplifying assumption 
that the stock of housing services is directly proportional to the number of 
units. But, for the affordability model, this simpliication needs to be relaxed. 
Apart from being the more appropriate concept theoretically, operationally it 
is a necessity. This is because, in terms of units, a one unit increase in new 
completions, offset by an increase in demolitions has no effect on the 
dwelling stock, also measured in terms of units, and consequently no effect 
on house prices. But a new dwelling is likely to contain more services than 
the demolished dwelling. Therefore, the effective housing stock is deined, 
which attempts to weight each unit by its implicit quantity of services.
Each unit (i) is weighted by its marginal utility m
i
, which assumes that a four 
bedroom house, for example, has a higher marginal utility than a two 
bedroom lat. The effective housing stock is given by (9):
 (9)
where (n) is the number of different property types X, which is in principle 
equal to the number of properties in the country if all are different.
Under competition, relative marginal utilities are relected in the relative 
prices (10).
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 (10)
and estimates of the relative prices of the different property types can be 
obtained from the hedonic equations in appendix 2.
 
(11)
where
 ˆP
i
 = predicted price from the pooled equations for each of the properties (i), 
i.e. distinguished by rooms, type, age etc.
In fact, the predicted price is not used directly since weights are required. 
Therefore, one dwelling type, (the most common property nationally), is 
chosen as a numeraire and given a weight of one. The weight of other 
property types becomes:
 (12)
So the properties with the highest utilities receive weights greater than one.
 
(13)
Therefore if new properties are built (high weight) and low weight dwellings 
are demolished, the effective stock rises. However, there is a further 
conceptual problem. (10) does not hold where there are externalities. In this 
case, the main externality is likely to be attachment to place. As noted 
earlier, the fact that a household has lived in a dwelling for twenty years 
raises the utility of the property to that individual, but does not raise the 
market price, since the attribute is speciic only to that household. Further 
problems arise through property rights discussed above. So the effective 
housing stock to existing residents may be higher than in (13).
Finally, the effective stock replaces the actual stock in the house price 
equations. However, the equations cannot be re-estimated because we only 
have the stock at one point in time (estimated for 2001). If the effective 
stock is the “true” measure relecting housing services, then there is an 
errors in variables problem. Although we have to assume the same 
coeficient as currently on the stock (–2.0), the direction of bias is known 
and the elasticity is likely to be underestimated (in absolute terms). 
Consequently, the effect of an increase in housing construction on 
affordability may also be underestimated.
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4.2 Modelling vacancies
4.2.1 General principles
As noted above, a key objective of recent developments in the affordability 
model is to ensure that the model has a well-deined equilibrium, consistent 
with equation (7). Vacancies play an important part in this. In the property 
literature this equilibrium is sometimes known as the natural vacancy rate and 
has an analogy to the labour market literature and the natural unemployment 
rate. However, the natural vacancy rate is often operationalised as an average 
of past vacancy rates, which implicitly smoothes out cyclical variations. 
However, this is unsatisfactory if, because of housing shortages, vacancies 
have never reached an equilibrium. We therefore attempt to model 
movements in vacancies explicitly and solve the equations for their 
equilibrium to obtain an estimate of the rates to which the model should 
converge. However, this may well mean that vacancy rates are higher than 
observed historically. Although there is a tendency to believe that vacant 
dwellings are a loss to society that need to be illed before new construction 
takes place, in fact a well-functioning housing market requires a certain 
number of vacant dwellings for the eficiency of the market and to aid 
household mobility.
Although the inal output needs to be in terms of regional vacancies, the 
modelling is conducted at the local level. Because of the spatial ixity of the 
housing stock, vacancies are primarily a local phenomenon. Two adjacent 
neighbourhoods may exist where vacancies are high in one and low in 
another, but the stock cannot be moved across boundaries to equalise 
conditions, although households can, of course, move. This perhaps matters 
most in low demand areas, where vacancies are particularly high. There is no 
guarantee in these areas that household inlows will occur. Indeed, the 
vacancies are more likely to reinforce outlows through cumulative decline. 
Furthermore, at local levels, household change takes place primarily through 
migration rather than natural increase. Therefore, the factors that affect local 
migration lows are likely to be important determinants of vacancies.
One inal important point needs to be borne in mind. Given equation (7), 
one variable has to be deined as a “residual” to ensure that the identity 
holds. The model implies that, once vacancy rates have reached an 
equilibrium, demolitions fulil this role, with the distribution of types of 
properties to be demolished determined in the manner described in the last 
sub section.
4.2.2 Data
There are two possible data sources for vacancies; (i) The English House 
Condition Survey, (ii) HIP operational data. At the regional and national level, 
HIP data are not the recommended source for the private sector. However, 
they are the only available source at the local authority level and are used 
here. This source also identiies properties that have been vacant for more or 
less than six months. For the private sector, owner-occupier and renting 
vacancies are considered together, given the possibility of substitution 
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between the two sectors. Typically, estimation includes 310 local authorities 
for which information is consistently available. Vacancy data are available 
from this source between 1990 and 2003. In each case vacancies are 
measured at 1st April of each year. In practice, the independent variables to 
be used in estimation are not available over this time period, so the full panel 
data structure cannot be exploited. Nevertheless, it is possible to add some 
dynamics. Most of the other data are taken from the 2001 census. But, in 
addition, the 2000 Index of Multiple Deprivation is used and local house 
price data from the Land Registry.
4.2.3 Model structure and empirical results
Vacancies are the difference between housing supply and demand, both 
measured as stocks.
 (14)
HD = housing demand in units
HS = Housing supply in units
VAC = Vacancies in units
i represents a spatial subscript (local authorities), subsequently suppressed for 
convenience.
Housing demand includes second as well as irst homes. The local authority 
housing demand equation is based on the work of Meen (2007) and can be 
written as (15).
 (15)
P = general price level index
Y = real income
IMD = index of multiple deprivation
HH = number of households
PH = local house price index
DUP = change in the unemployment rate
Conditional on the dwelling stock, this gives rise to the vacancies 
equation (16).
 (16)
Note that IMD appears directly as a determinant of house prices in Meen 
(2007). It is also correlated with real household income. But we have also 
found IMD to be an important determinant of migration lows (Meen et al 
2005). As noted above, at the local level, migration is a major way in which 
population increases or decreases. Overall, therefore, we expect deprivation 
to be an important factor in determining vacancies.
Since demand does not respond immediately to changes in the variables in 
(15), vacancies in (16) would also be expected to adjust with a lag. Equation 
(17) sets out one possible speciication.
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 (17)
where:
ε = error term
The equation can be estimated, distinguishing between properties that have 
been vacant for more or less than six months. The estimation results for the 
former are given in table 2.2 in appendix 2. Note that house prices and 
incomes have been dropped, because of their correlation with IMD. Solving 
the equation for its long-run solution yields equation (18). The solution is 
derived under the assumption that HS=HH, so that even if the number of 
units and the number of households match, there will still be a positive level 
of vacancies.
 (18)
Therefore, the vacancy rate depends on demand in each area, where the 
level of deprivation is the key indicator and supply is represented by the 
housing stock. If IMD= 0 and ignoring the constant, vacancies are 1.93 
per cent of the private sector housing stock. But the rate is higher in areas of 
low demand. Table 10 sets out the rates in each region, allowing for the 
levels of deprivation. Although these may appear quite low, it should be 
remembered that they refer to vacancies in excess of six months, which are 
approximately 50 per cent of the total. These are important as a bench mark 
for the solutions to the full affordability model.
Table 10: Estimated Vacancy Rates (more than six months)
Region Estimated Vacancy Rate (%)
North East 2.02
Yorks & Humber 1.77
E Midlands 1.37
East 1.17
London 1.78
South East 1.10
South West 1.25
W Midlands 1.62
North West 1.75
Table 2.3 in appendix 2 presents the results in slightly different form using 
(18) as the measure of the equilibrium vacancy rate (VAC*).19 This implies 
that approximately 44 per cent of the disequilibrium in the vacancy rate is 
eliminated each year. Therefore, vacancies tend towards the equilibrium fairly 
19 Note that “equilibrium” is used in a statistical sense, i.e. the level to which vacancies return following a shock 
to the system, conditional on the values of the other variables in the equation. This allows the equation to be 
written in error correction form.
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quickly. Finally, as noted above, the adjustment is affected by the difference 
between the housing stock and the number of households (HS-HH). In 
practice, this inluences the speed of adjustment since it captures an 
additional form of disequilibrium.
The results so far are concerned with properties that are vacant for more 
than six months. But the model also includes short-term vacancies. In this 
case we would expect movements to be similar across the regions, since 
similar institutional factors are in operation. In particular, the central variable 
affecting vacancies in excess of six months – the deprivation rate – would be 
expected to be less important than in the earlier equations and, indeed, 
turns out to be insigniicant. Given the insigniicance of deprivation, the 
equation implies that the primary driver of short-term vacancies is the 
deviation between the housing stock and the number of households.
4.3 Modelling second homes
In equation (7), second homes have to be taken into account as a 
component of housing demand. However, not all second homes are included 
in this category; in particular second homes that are held as an investment to 
be let out in the private rental market, e.g. Buy to Let properties, do not 
“use up” dwellings. In other words they have no net effect. In addition to 
investment motives, second homes are held for a variety of purposes (and 
often for more than one purpose). Some of these motives are temporary – 
dwellings that are going through probate, homes required for individuals 
working away, homes bought for student offspring. These are typically fairly 
small categories and can be ignored for our purposes. But for the model, 
holiday homes or weekend cottages (as deined in the Survey of English 
Housing) have to be explicitly modelled. Because they add to demand, they 
inluence house prices, although the spatial pattern across the country is 
far from uniform.
Modelling employs household data from the 2002 Survey of English Housing 
(SEH) and uses a probit equation to estimate the probability that a household 
with a given set of characteristics will own a holiday home. The sample used 
in estimation is restricted to those households who already own a irst home 
as owner-occupiers. In total, 11,238 observations are used, although only 
174 have a holiday home.
The independent variables used in estimation are determined by the 
structure of the tenure equations considered in chapter 3. The model gives 
tenure disaggregated by household age, gender, presence of children, 
marital status and income. Therefore, the same variables are used to 
determine the probability of having a holiday home. Multiplying the 
probabilities by the number of households of each type yields the expected 
number of households with holiday homes. This variable feeds into the 
aggregate house price equations.
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Table 2.5 in appendix 2 sets out the estimated equation. Although the 
coeficients cannot be interpreted as marginal effects, households whose 
principal residence is in London have the highest probability of owning a 
holiday home. Of course, this does not mean that the second home is also in 
London. The North East is the default region and households from this 
region have the lowest probabilities of owning a second home, holding 
other factors constant. The regional ranking is closely correlated with the 
ranking of house prices, which are not separately included in the equation, 
but are captured by the regional dummies. For households, who already 
have a irst home, house prices provide collateral for the second dwelling.
Table 2.5 suggests that gender and marital status do not have strong effects 
on the probability of owning a holiday home. But income and age are 
important inluences. Age has a non-linear effect and simulations on the 
equation estimate that more than 90 per cent of holiday home owners are 
over the age of 40.
Table 11 shows the probabilities of holiday home-ownership for a selection 
of household types. As expected, in general, the probabilities are low; as an 
extreme case, a married male in London with children, aged 45, with an 
income in the forth quartile has a probability of 5.5 per cent. But the table 
shows the probabilities fall sharply with income.
Table 11: Probabilities of Owning a Holiday Home (selected households 
and locations, 2002)
Household Type Probability (%)
London, male, children, married, income quartile 4, 
age 45
5.5
North East, male, children, married, income quartile 4, 
age 45
0.7
South East, male, children, married, income quartile 2, 
age 45
1.1
South East, male, children, married, income quartile 2, 
age 25
0.0
South East, female, no children, single, income quartile 4, 
age 25
0.3
South West, female, no children, single, income quartile 
4, age 35
1.3
As noted above, from the estimated probabilities and the number of 
households in each group, the expected total number of households with 
holiday homes can be computed.20 On the basis of SEH data, 75 per cent of 
these homes are assumed to be in England. Furthermore, the same source is 
used to allocate the holiday homes to speciic regions. Unsurprisingly, the 
20 Although there are no exact published igures with which comparisons can be made, information available 
from CLG live tables on second homes are an aid and adjustments to the model predictions have been made 
to relect this external information.
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highest percentages of holiday homes are located in the South West and 
South East.
4.4 Modelling Right to Buy sales
Across the public and private sectors together, transfers net out. But the 
model needs to distinguish the public and private sectors. This means that 
Right to Buy, (RTB), sales in particular have to be modelled explicitly.
Although Right to Buy sales irst began in 1980 and the strongest growth 
was during the eighties, arguably the early years were atypical as the market 
adjusted to a new equilibrium. Estimation from the eighties is also 
complicated by the change from Standard Statistical Regions (SSRs) to 
Government Ofice Regions (GORs). Therefore, the equations in the model 
are based on a shorter time span,1991/92 to 2005/6, but attempt to 
overcome the limited period by using regionally pooled data.
The determinants of RTB sales are assumed to be the local authority housing 
stock, the average RTB discount percentage, the mortgage interest rate, and 
house prices (both the level and rate of change). Therefore, the relationship 
emphasises the post-discount mortgage payment faced by purchasers. 
Increases in the discount percentage and higher (expected) capital gains raise 
sales, but increases in interest rates, which raise borrowing costs, reduce 
demand. Table 2.6 sets out the results from an initial version, including a 
lagged dependent variable. Note that the table includes no income measure. 
Although this might be expected to be important, we found no consistent 
effect on sales.
In table 2.6 the coeficients are in line with expectations. Higher interest 
rates and the level of real house prices reduce RTB demand, whereas an 
increase in the discount and higher capital gains increase demand. 
Furthermore, the relative sizes of the coeficients suggest a simpliication of 
the variables into a single measure of housing costs. This is given by 
equation (19) and has a ready interpretation as a form of housing user cost 
of capital (see chapter 3).
 (19)
where:
P = General price index
RTB = Right to Buy Sales (numbers)
DISC = Average RTB discount
RBM = Mortgage interest rate
PH = House price index
(γ ) lies between zero and one and has been used in previous work 
on owner-occupation. A value of one implies that decisions are determined 
by real interest rates alone; a value of zero implies that only nominal rates 
matter. Past work has found that the value lies between 0.1 and 0.3. (γ ) 
takes a value of 0.15 in table 2.7.
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Chapter 5: Model simulations
The model is now large and its complexity has increased since the irst 
version. Furthermore, some aspects of the model are non-linear and, 
therefore, the model responds differently to policy changes according to the 
underlying position in the base scenario from which simulations are run. This 
chapter attempts to illustrate the central characteristics of the model through 
a series of simulations. The limitations of such exercises should, however, 
perhaps be stressed. Models are primarily a tool to aid thought and to help, 
rather than replace, policy makers and planners. Models help us to think in a 
more consistent framework; often the indirect effects of policy actions are 
not immediately clear and models can help us to highlight such effects. But 
the affordability model looks well into the future (2031 in the simulations 
below) and the margins of error are inevitably large. Unforeseeable national 
and international shocks are bound to mean that affordability (on whatever 
measure) cannot be predicted with a high degree of precision twenty years 
into the future. Therefore, we need to be modest about what models can 
achieve, but, nevertheless, they can be very useful as a means of simulating 
the effects of alternative policy scenarios.
The questions that the model attempts to examine are:
By how much can affordability be improved by increases in housing (i) 
construction? The 2007 green paper raises the target to 240,000 net 
additions by 2016. This was the primary question that the original model 
was set up to answer. But the issue is now whether the answer changes 
signiicantly given the subsequent model developments. The chapter also 
discusses whether there is some point beyond which further construction 
has a diminished effect on affordability. This is one example of a non-
linearity. As part of the simulations, the question of who would live in 
the homes is addressed.
Where should any increases in housing be concentrated to maximise (ii) 
effect?
What are the constraints on raising home-ownership rates from the (iii) 
current level of approximately 70 per cent?
Now that the model distinguishes the effective housing stock, are there (iv) 
lessons for the types of dwellings that should be constructed as well as 
the number of units? This is tied up with iltering of the housing stock.
Is it feasible to set targets for net additions to the housing stock, rather (v) 
than gross housing starts? Although policy is currently set in terms of the 
former, the fact that demolitions are determined within the model raises 
interesting questions concerning the appropriate target.
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Before the results of the scenarios are discussed, the chapter sets out the 
main features of the baseline scenario from which the simulations are run.
5.1 The baseline
The base case has to make assumptions concerning the level of housing 
construction in each of the years between 2008 (the starting point) and 
2031. However, it should be noted that in both the baseline and later 
simulations, there is an important difference in methodology from that 
employed by the NHPAU in its reports. The NHPAU generally concentrates on 
net additions and in its simulations of the effects of increasing construction 
(NHPAU 2007), the Unit assumes that net additions remain constant at the 
levels reached in 2016 in subsequent years. By contrast, here, the emphasis 
is on gross starts. Because of the endogeneity of demolitions, there is not 
necessarily a one-to-one relationship between starts and net additions, 
particularly at high levels of construction.
In the base case, we have assumed that total housing starts in England are 
approximately 160,000 units per annum throughout the period. These 
igures are derived as the average for the period 2004-2006. They yield 
values for net additions to the housing stock of approximately 180,000 units 
per annum, although these are slightly lower in the later years of the 
baseline due to the endogeneity of demolitions. The difference between 
starts and net additions also relects conversions and changes in use. The 
level is higher, however, than for most of the period since the early nineties. 
Furthermore, they are noticeably higher than original plans under regional 
planning guidance (150,000 per annum). Therefore, the base case already 
includes recent successes in raising housing construction from the levels of 
the early nineties.
Table 12 summarises some of the other key assumptions and outputs in the 
base case for England as a whole. The table indicates nominal income 
growth of slightly greater than 5 per cent and real growth of approximately 
2.5 per cent. These are similar to the projections in the irst report. 
Therefore, little of the difference in the results for affordability since the 
original report arises from the labour market elements of the model.
Demolitions in the base case show only minor changes between the two 
sub-periods and are similar to values in recent years. Notice that the table 
concentrates on private sector demolitions; although the historic 
disaggregation of the data between the private and public sectors is subject 
to error, the table uses private demolitions as the sector that faces market 
pressures. Since annual net additions are approximately 180,000 per annum, 
but oficial household projections are 223,000 per annum, demolitions are 
unlikely to rise signiicantly. As noted in chapter 4, housing shortages extend 
the effective life of dwellings.
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Table 12: Key Assumptions and Outputs in the Base Case (England)
Av. 2006-2016 Av. 2016-2031
Average earnings (% pa) 5.1 5.1
Mortgage rate (%) 5.60 5.75
Consumers expenditure delator (% pa) 2.5 2.5
Net Additions (000s inal year) 180 176
Ownership rate (% inal year) 70.0 68.5
Private demolitions (000s) 7580 8150
Affordability (lower quarter, inal year) 7.95 10.30
However, this highlights an important assumption of the model. Housing 
shortages would be expected to lead to worsening affordability. Indeed, 
table 12 indicates that, nationally, affordability would worsen to 7.95 by 
2016 and to 10.30 by 2031, compared with 7.1 in 2006.21 Furthermore, 
chapter 2 demonstrated that, even if new construction matched household 
formation, affordability would be expected to deteriorate. But, from 
Figure 1, the model would predict a reduction in the rate of household 
formation in response to the worsening affordability. In fact, the model 
suggests that there would be little, if any, increase in household 
representative rates or, equivalently, the average household size would not 
decrease over the future. By contrast, oficial household projections indicate 
a reduction in average household size from 2.34 in 2004 to 2.09 in 2029.
The model in the base case, therefore, indicates lower levels of household 
formation than in the trend-based oficial projections in response to 
worsening affordability. But since housing is generally considered a merit 
good and failure to provide adequate housing may lead to externalities, such 
as poor educational and workplace performance, it may be argued that 
reliance on a pure market outcome is inappropriate. Equally, it might be 
argued that oficial household projections are not a measure of housing 
need, but nevertheless the model assumes that the oficial household 
projections have to be met and those that are not housed in the market 
sector22 (as estimated by the model) receive subsidised housing either in the 
social or private rental sectors. This accounts for the fact that the ownership 
rate changes little from current levels by 2016 and, indeed, falls by the inal 
year. Meeting oficial household numbers lowers the ownership rate since 
those who cannot afford owner-occupation costs are housed in the rental 
sectors. Leaving the outcome to the market alone would lead to higher rates 
of ownership since lower income groups would be unable to form 
households.
21 The estimates are presented to two decimal places for illustration. But this is a spurious degree of accuracy. 
Commentators rarely agree on what is likely to happen to house prices over the next year, let alone the next 
25 years. However, concentration on the longer term allows us to avoid the complications associated with the 
short-run cycle and, arguably, from Chapter 2, we understand more about the long-run trends than the cycle.
22 Note, “market sector” is not the same as owner-occupied housing, since some households will also pay market 
rates in the rental sector.
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Two further factors that affect the ownership rate need to be mentioned. 
First, as discussed in chapter 2, the model assumes that (unsubsidised) 
housing costs in the three tenures change in line with each other. If private 
rental costs rose faster than ownership costs, home ownership would be 
larger than in table 12, although ownership would still be constrained by the 
credit constraints discussed earlier. Second, ownership rates are affected by 
transfers, such as Right-to-Buy sales. Indeed, these have had a major impact 
on ownership in the past. However, from equation (19), if real house prices 
are rising strongly, as in the base scenario, the cost of purchase is also high 
unless the average discount is raised to offset the increase in costs. Since the 
model does not make this assumption and projects the discount at a similar 
level to recent years, RTB sales fall over the projection horizon and, in fact, 
make little contribution to raising ownership rates in the base case and the 
subsequent simulations. Of course, policies that were successful in raising RTB 
sales would generate higher levels of ownership than given in this paper.
Home-ownership rates are calculated from the proportion of households 
who own a dwelling, but some households also own additional homes. As 
explained in the last chapter, for our purposes, the important igure is the 
proportion of households who own holiday homes. In practice, distinguishing 
houses that are purely for holidays is dificult, since they may be held for 
multiple purposes. Therefore, the igures in table 13 are approximate and 
require an element of judgement. However, the most important features of 
the table are the expected rise in the percentage over the future, relecting 
real income growth and the spatial dispersion of holiday home owners. Note 
that the table shows the principle location of households who own holiday 
homes, not the spatial distribution of holiday homes.
Table 13: Percentage of Households who Own Holiday Homes (%)
2008 2012 2016 2026 2031
Greater London 1.6 1.9 2.2 3.0 3.5
South East 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.7 2.0
East 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.8
South West 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.7 2.0
East  Midlands 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9
West Midlands 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.6
Yorks & Humber 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.4
North West 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.8
North East 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6
Against this background, igure 8 graphs affordability in each of the regions. 
A feature is the relative stability of the ratios in the irst part of the period, 
but a worsening in the second part. This relects the cycle and most 
commentators expect a weakening of the market in the short term. 
Arguably, there could be a stronger “dip” in the ratios over the next two 
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years, with prices growing signiicantly slower than earnings. It is important 
to stress that Figure 8 does not relect a central view of the outlook for 
regional affordability. Construction is below the 240,000 target for net 
additions set out in the green paper. An assumption that construction is 
equal to the average of the 2004-2006 period is simply a reasonable 
approximation to recent behaviour as a starting point.
Figure 8: Regional Affordability (Lower Quartile, Base Case)
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The central innovation of chapter 4 is to ensure that the model has a well-
deined long-run equilibrium, achieved through a combination of price 
adjustment, variations in household formation, changes in vacancies and 
demolitions. However, since we assume that oficial projections have to be 
met, one of the adjustment variables (household formation) is cut off from 
the system. Under these circumstances it is possible, with relatively low levels 
of construction, that vacancies never achieve their equilibrium values 
according to the equations given in tables 2.3 and 2.4. Figure 9 shows that 
this is the case. The igure highlights a possible inconsistency between 
construction levels and household projections, even though construction in 
the base is relatively high compared with the period since 1990. Successive 
upward revisions to the household projections worsen the problem. In many 
regions, the vacancy rates become negative by the end of the period; 
London is particularly noticeable. An alternative interpretation of this inding 
is that an increase in the number of sharing households will be required over 
the future. But we stress again that this does not represent a central 
projection, nor does it relect current policy.
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Figure 9: Regional Vacancy Rates – 180,000 Case
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5.2 The 240,000 Units Case
The irst simulation does not attempt to model the effects of the housing 
green paper target to achieve 240,000 net additions per annum by 2016. 
This is principally because it focuses on housing starts, a distinction which is 
highlighted above. Also, the model would require further information not 
available from the green paper directly. First, the precise time proile of 
construction is not discussed in the green paper; second, the regional 
distribution is not given, although the Regional Spatial Strategies provide 
information on pre-green paper plans. Third, the 240,000 units have to be 
distributed between the private and social sectors. Regional planning 
guidance allocates future targets for net additions to the housing stock 
between affordable and mainstream housing. However, the former is not the 
same as social housing since it includes shared ownership schemes for 
example. The distinction matters for housing analysis since shared ownership 
is more likely to behave like mainstream owner-occupation in terms of its 
pressures on house prices than social rental housing.
The simulation assumes a gradual build up over the period from 2008 to 
2016 to 240,000 units and, in terms of input, changes are to housing starts, 
rather than net additions, because of the endogeneity of demolitions. Starts 
are assumed to remain at the higher level after 2016.
In order to obtain the regional distribution, it would have been possible 
simply to scale the igures in the regional spatial strategies. However, an 
alternative approach is used, whereby the difference between the 240,000 
and 180,000 unit cases are distributed according to the level of vacancies 
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shown in igure 9. Therefore, London obtains a disproportionate share of the 
additional homes. Finally, given the distinction between social and affordable 
housing, we have generally assumed that the majority are in the latter 
category. Results are unlikely to be highly sensitive to modest variations in 
these assumptions.
Numbers of private and social housing starts in each region are shown in table 
14, along with net additions and affordability. Table 15 provides comparable 
information, measured as differences from the base scenario. The inal row of 
the table indicates that by the inal year, the additional 60,000 starts might 
lead to an improvement in affordability of approximately one point in the inal 
year. The irst report suggested that a 100,000 increase in housing construction 
between 2006 and 2016 would also improve affordability by approximately 
one point. Despite the similarity in the results, the indings are not completely 
comparable. First, here, construction increases gradually over time to reach its 
maximum only in 2016. Second, the size of the construction increase is rather 
smaller at 60,000 per annum. Third, as discussed in chapter 4, the model now 
employs the concept of the effective housing stock, so that new construction 
has a greater effect on prices than in previous versions. Nevertheless, despite all 
the caveats, the fundamental results of the earlier study do not change.
Table 14: Construction and Affordability (240,000 units case, selected years)
Year 2008 2012 2016 2026 2031
Greater London
Private Starts (gross) 18644 23644 27644 27644 27644
Social Starts (gross) 6759 10759 10759 10759 10759
Net Additions 24978 34325 41228 40961 40830
Affordability (lower quartile) 9.27 9.19 9.61 10.20 10.28
South East
Private Starts (gross) 28063 30063 31063 31063 31063
Social Starts (gross) 4691 4691 4691 4691 4691
Net Additions 33683 35921 37810 37532 37394
Affordability (lower quartile) 8.53 8.86 9.49 11.13 11.52
East
Private Starts (gross) 21578 25578 28578 28578 28578
Social Starts (gross) 3050 4050 4050 4050 4050
Net Additions 23153 29545 33500 33376 33315
Affordability (lower quartile) 7.82 8.18 8.67 9.69 9.98
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Year 2008 2012 2016 2026 2031
South West
Private Starts (gross) 18952 22952 25952 25952 25952
Social Starts (gross) 2340 3340 3340 3340 3340
Net Additions 23302 27814 31772 31658 31601
Affordability (lower quartile) 8.74 9.07 9.67 10.99 11.46
East Midlands
Private Starts (gross) 18716 21716 21716 21716 21716
Social Starts (gross) 1693 1693 1693 1693 1693
Net Additions 16800 24548 24501 18854 15583
Affordability (lower quartile) 6.49 6.42 6.65 7.83 8.26
West Midlands
Private Starts (gross) 16174 19174 19174 19174 19174
Social Starts (gross) 1732 1732 1732 1732 1732
Net Additions 12793 19139 18972 18563 18361
Affordability (lower quartile) 6.28 6.40 6.67 7.84 8.18
Yorkshire and the Humber
Private Starts (gross) 17264 20264 20264 20264 20264
Social Starts (gross) 1382 1482 1482 1482 1482
Net Additions 19449 22917 22743 22315 22104
Affordability (lower quartile) 5.74 5.72 5.75 6.70 7.19
North West
Private Starts (gross) 22508 25508 25508 25508 25508
Social Starts (gross) 1862 1862 1862 1862 1862
Net Additions 16869 23465 23183 22489 22148
Affordability (lower quartile) 5.69 5.72 6.00 7.26 7.70
North East
Private Starts (gross) 8227 8227 8227 8227 8227
Social Starts (gross) 1538 2538 2538 2538 2538
Net Additions 5341 8499 8384 8104 5740
Affordability (lower quartile) 5.30 5.35 5.61 6.72 7.10
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Year 2008 2012 2016 2026 2031
England
Private Starts (gross) 170126 197126 208126 208126 208126
Social Starts (gross) 25047 32147 32147 32147 32147
Net Additions 176366 226173 242093 233852 227076
Affordability (lower quartile) 7.26 7.40 7.77 8.99 9.37
Table 15:Construction and Affordability (240,000 units case, selected 
years) – Differences from Base Case
Year 2008 2012 2016 2026 2031
Greater London
Private Starts (gross) 1000 6000 10000 10000 10000
Social Starts (gross) 1000 5000 5000 5000 5000
Net Additions 0 7995 14973 14891 14850
Affordability (lower quartile) 0.00 –0.05 –0.32 –0.99 –1.03
South East
Private Starts (gross) 1000 3000 4000 4000 4000
Social Starts (gross) 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Net Additions 0 2996 4985 4953 4936
Affordability (lower quartile) 0.00 –0.03 –0.18 –0.59 –0.65
East
Private Starts (gross) 1000 5000 8000 8000 8000
Social Starts (gross) 1000 2000 2000 2000 2000
Net Additions 0 5998 9988 9956 9939
Affordability (lower quartile) 0.00 –0.05 –0.30 –1.21 –1.38
South West
Private Starts (gross) 1000 5000 8000 8000 8000
Social Starts (gross) 1000 2000 2000 2000 2000
Net Additions 0 5998 9989 9957 9942
Affordability (lower quartile) 0.00 –0.05 –0.33 –1.41 –1.65
East Midlands
Private Starts (gross) 1000 4000 4000 4000 4000
Social Starts (gross) 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Net Additions 0 4997 4989 –562 –3786
Affordability (lower quartile) 0.00 –0.02 –0.13 –0.61 –0.68
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Year 2008 2012 2016 2026 2031
West Midlands
Private Starts (gross) 1000 4000 4000 4000 4000
Social Starts (gross) 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Net Additions 0 4988 4957 4879 4840
Affordability (lower quartile) 0.00 –0.02 –0.12 –0.60 –0.74
Yorkshire and the Humber
Private Starts (gross) 1000 4000 4000 4000 4000
Social Starts (gross) 1000 1100 1100 1100 1100
Net Additions 0 5089 5058 4983 4945
Affordability (lower quartile) 0.00 –0.01 –0.11 –0.66 –0.86
North West
Private Starts (gross) 1000 4000 4000 4000 4000
Social Starts (gross) 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Net Additions 0 4984 4942 4837 4785
Affordability (lower quartile) 0.00 –0.01 –0.09 –0.50 –0.63
North East
Private Starts (gross) 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Social Starts (gross) 1000 2000 2000 2000 2000
Net Additions 0 2990 2977 2944 701
Affordability (lower quartile) 0.00 –0.02 –0.10 –0.49 –0.60
England
Private Starts (gross) 9000 36000 47000 47000 47000
Social Starts (gross) 9000 16100 16100 16100 16100
Net Additions 0 46035 62860 56837 51151
Affordability (lower quartile) 0.00 –0.03 –0.18 –0.79 –0.92
Although not shown in the table, private demolitions for England as a whole 
between 2006 and 2016 average 7,600 – levels similar to those in table 12 
for the base case. However, the average between 2016 and 2031 is 12,500, 
compared with 8,150 in the base and reach 20,000 by the inal year. 
Therefore, in the second part of the simulation, demolitions rise signiicantly. 
New construction replaces part of the existing stock. Consequently increases 
in gross starts do not lead to a proportionate rise in net additions and the 
quality of the housing stock improves.
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The difference between the 240,000 case and the 180,000 scenario is that 
construction now increases faster than the oficial household projections. In 
some regions, this allows vacancy rates to reach an equilibrium and any 
additional units can be employed to improve housing services for existing 
households. But since equation (7) must still hold,23 iltering implies that the 
poorest parts of the housing stock could be demolished. Figure 10 shows the 
private sector vacancy rates in the new scenario are considerably higher than 
in igure 9. But London still stands out as the area with below equilibrium 
vacancies and there is scope for redistributing further the 240,000 units of 
new construction towards London, in which case national demolitions would 
be lower. But, in general, approximately 240,000 units are suficient to meet 
oficial household projections and to restore vacancies to equilibrium. 
However, this does not necessarily guarantee that affordability is stabilised. 
The next two simulations consider the impact of higher numbers of units 
versus changes in the type of dwellings constructed i.e. higher quality.
Figure 10: Regional Vacancy Rates – 240,000 Case
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Table 16 considers changes in home-ownership rates compared with the base 
scenario. In order to understand the impact of higher construction, it is helpful 
to summarise the key inluences on ownership rates. First, in the absence of 
constraints, relative tenure prices have a strong effect. But, as noted above, by 
assumption, rents change in line with ownership costs and consequently the 
changes in ownership rates in the simulation cannot be attributed to this 
source. Second, demographics are important determinants of tenure – 
younger households have higher probabilities of renting – but the simulation 
does not change the demographic proile of households. Third, ownership 
rates are affected by credit constraints. The central role of sustained increases 
23 The induced effects on second homes, conversions and changes in use are small.
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in private housing supply is to generate some relaxation of these constraints. 
In the short and medium term – for example up to 2016, the increases in 
ownership rates are modest. This relects the inding in table 7 that the credit 
restrictions remain binding until well into the projection period and, generally, 
the improvement in affordability arising from the increase in supply is 
insuficient to overcome the credit constraints in the short term. But, in the 
long run, increases in housing supply lead to sustainable, i.e. permanent, 
increases in home ownership as affordability improves in a manner that 
demand subsidies cannot. Demand subsidies are typically capitalised into 
higher house prices. The increases in London are particularly large, but this 
primarily relects the above average increases in construction (table 15).24
Table 16: Home Ownership Rates, %, (Differences from Base Case in 
brackets, percentage points)
2008 2012 2016 2026 2031
England
Owners (%)
69.38 
(0.00)
69.62 
(0.01)
70.14 
(0.15)
70.92 
(1.18)
70.28 
(1.89)
London
Owners (%)
55.94 
(0.00)
56.56 
(0.04)
57.29 
(0.41)
58.69 
(3.44)
57.86 
(4.54)
SE
Owners (%)
70.02 
(0.00)
72.20 
(–0.04)
72.85 
(–0.09)
73.05 
(0.35)
71.27 
(0.74)
East
Owners (%)
70.19 
(0.00)
69.93 
(0.03)
70.41 
(0.28)
71.11 
(1.71)
70.47 
(3.06)
SW
Owners (%)
71.61 
(0.00)
70.83 
(0.04)
70.94 
(0.44)
72.27 
(1.78)
72.24 
(3.20)
EM
Owners (%)
74.47 
(0.00)
74.77 
(0.01)
75.20 
(0.05)
76.79 
(0.43)
76.89 
(0.68)
WM
Owners (%)
70.88 
(0.00)
71.67 
(0.01)
72.35 
(0.06)
72.88 
(0.62)
71.96 
(1.03)
YH
Owners (%)
71.03 
(0.00)
70.99 
(0.01)
71.46 
(0.05)
72.78 
(0.51)
73.17 
(1.06)
NW
Owners (%)
74.20 
(0.00)
74.84 
(0.01)
75.32 
(0.05)
75.22 
(0.37)
74.76 
(0.64)
NE
Owners (%)
66.62 
(0.00)
67.68 
(0.01)
68.35 
(0.07)
69.06 
(0.43)
68.51 
(0.68)
24 In addition, the fact that ownership rates are lower in London than elsewhere means that there is a greater 
catch up to the mean.
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5.3 The 290,000 Units Case
The third case considers even higher levels of construction, i.e. an additional 
50,000 units compared with the previous case. The new distribution of gross 
housing starts is given in table 17. Figure 11 shows affordability for England 
as a whole and compares the outcome with the two previous cases. Clearly, 
affordability improves further. In 2031, national lower quartile affordability 
stands at 8.79. However, the 50,000 increase from the previous case 
improves affordability by 0.60 percentage points, whereas the 60,000 rise in 
construction between the 180,000 and 240,000 cases raised affordability by 
more than 0.9 points. Therefore, the model exhibits a degree of non–
linearity, although we should not overstate the extent and the model 
suggests that there may be some point beyond which increases in 
construction have only a limited effect on affordability if the types of 
properties constructed are similar to those built in the recent past. The 
caveat is important and we return to the issue in the next simulation.
Although the housing stock is higher in this scenario, table 17 indicates that 
net additions in 2031 are (i) lower than in 2016 (216,000 compared with 
290,000) and (ii) lower than in the 240,000 scenario (216,000 compared 
with 227,000). These again illustrate the equilibrium in the model and the 
implied levels of demolitions. At much higher levels of construction in excess 
of household formation, vacancy rates reach their equilibrium more quickly, 
implying that there is greater scope for improving the quality of the stock in 
the later years. Under this scenario, private sector demolitions for England as 
a whole average 55,000 between 2016 and 2031, reaching 95,000 in the 
inal year. Figure 12 graphs the regional vacancy rates and shows that all 
regions exhibit positive vacancies over the longer term.
Although not shown in the tables, the simulation still does little to improve 
ownership rates by 2016, but raises the rate by 2.8 percentage points in the 
long run. Therefore the same points raised in the previous simulation still 
hold. Credit constraints remain binding in the shorter term, but, in the long 
run, increases in production are necessary to raise sustainable owner 
occupation.
Table 17: Construction and Affordability (290,000 units case, selected years)
Year 2008 2012 2016 2026 2031
Greater London
Private Starts (gross) 19644 27644 35644 37644 37644
Social Starts (gross) 6759 10759 13759 13759 13759
Net Additions 24978 38320 50209 53866 35836
Affordability (lower quartile) 9.27 9.16 9.43 9.42 9.57
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Year 2008 2012 2016 2026 2031
South East
Private Starts (gross) 29063 34063 35063 35063 35063
Social Starts (gross) 4691 5691 5691 5691 5691
Net Additions 33683 40916 42792 40571 35332
Affordability (lower quartile) 8.53 8.82 9.30 10.58 10.99
East
Private Starts (gross) 22578 30578 36578 36578 36578
Social Starts (gross) 3050 6050 6050 6050 6050
Net Additions 23153 35543 43488 27604 25780
Affordability (lower quartile) 7.82 8.14 8.40 8.90 9.41
South West
Private Starts (gross) 20952 28952 34952 34952 34952
Social Starts (gross) 2340 5340 5340 5340 5340
Net Additions 23302 34810 34440 29720 27075
Affordability (lower quartile) 8.74 9.01 9.30 10.34 10.94
East Midlands
Private Starts (gross) 19716 23716 26716 26716 26716
Social Starts (gross) 1693 2693 2693 2693 2693
Net Additions 16800 26546 28804 18666 15562
Affordability (lower quartile) 6.49 6.41 6.55 7.39 7.75
West Midlands
Private Starts (gross) 16174 20174 23174 23174 23174
Social Starts (gross) 1732 2732 2732 2732 2732
Net Additions 12793 20139 23961 19376 17046
Affordability (lower quartile) 6.28 6.40 6.60 7.35 7.62
Yorkshire and the Humber
Private Starts (gross) 17264 21264 24264 24264 24264
Social Starts (gross) 1382 2482 2482 2482 2482
Net Additions 19449 23917 27732 27228 26979
Affordability (lower quartile) 5.74 5.72 5.71 6.25 6.58
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Year 2008 2012 2016 2026 2031
North West
Private Starts (gross) 22508 26508 29508 29508 29508
Social Starts (gross) 1862 1862 1862 1862 1862
Net Additions 16869 23465 27167 27368 26975
Affordability (lower quartile) 5.69 5.72 5.94 6.84 7.19
North East
Private Starts (gross) 8227 10227 10227 10227 10227
Social Starts (gross) 1538 3538 3538 3538 3538
Net Additions 5341 11489 11348 6424 5429
Affordability (lower quartile) 5.30 5.34 5.50 6.30 6.63
England
Private Starts (gross) 176126 223126 256126 258126 258126
Social Starts (gross) 25047 41147 44147 44147 44147
Net Additions 176366 255146 289941 250823 216013
Affordability (lower quartile) 7.26 7.38 7.62 8.42 8.79
Figure 11: Affordability in the 3 Cases (England)
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Figure 12: Regional Private Sector Vacancy Rates (290,000 case)
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Finally, table 18 draws together the results, for England as a whole, across 
the three cases, highlighting the implications for affordability and owner-
occupation. Higher levels of housing construction certainly produce 
signiicant permanent improvements in both variables, but the table 
demonstrates that this is a long-term, rather than short-term strategy.
Table 18: Housing Affordability and Home-Ownership 
(summary for England)
2006 2012 2016 2026 2031
Baseline
Affordability 7.1 7.4 8.0 9.8 10.3
Ownership (%) 69.4 69.6 70.0 69.7 68.4
240,000 Case
Affordability 7.1 7.4 7.8 9.0 9.4
Ownership (%) 69.4 69.6 70.1 70.9 70.3
290,000 Case
Affordability 7.1 7.4 7.6 8.4 8.8
Ownership (%) 69.4 69.6 70.3 71.7 71.3
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5.4 Improving the quality of the housing stock
The previous simulation suggested that there may come a point at which 
building extra units has limited effect on house prices. Chapter 4 
demonstrated that the model has attempted to capture some elements of 
quality improvement through the introduction of an effective housing stock. 
Furthermore, chapter 2 argued that an important reason why affordability is 
expected to worsen over the future arises from increasing demand for 
housing services from existing households, whose real incomes are rising. 
This group are likely to require higher quality homes. However, the 
simulations so far have all assumed that new dwellings relect the recent 
experience in terms of the types of dwellings constructed. Alternatively, as 
incomes grow, it could be assumed that higher quality than average homes 
are constructed. Therefore, this stresses that a concentration on the number 
of housing units alone is not suficient. The model can be used to illustrate 
that further improvements in affordability compared with the previous cases 
could be obtained if more construction were at the higher end of the 
market. It may not be appropriate, for example to build 240,000 starter 
homes. The iltering processes described in chapter 4 would still suggest that 
homes become available at the lower end of the market.
At irst sight, this might suggest a call for larger homes with correspondingly 
greater land requirements. In fact, this cannot be inferred from the model. 
It is possible that higher levels of housing services – for example, through the 
quality of design – can be incorporated within limited urban space. Space is 
substitutable for other services. However, the model can give an indication 
of the possible effects on affordability from constructing larger than average 
homes. As a broad guide, the 240,000 unit scenario was re-run under the 
extreme (and unrealistic) assumption that all the new homes in the South 
East, South West and East were medium-sized detached dwellings. By the 
second half of the simulation period, the model suggested that affordability 
might improve by a further percentage point in each of the three regions. 
To repeat, the assumptions are extreme, but they illustrate that housing 
quality matters to improving affordability.
5.5 Relaxing deposit requirements
The simulations so far have all operated on the supply-side of the market, 
but they illustrate the dificulty of improving ownership rates in the short to 
medium term. The inability of younger, lower income households to meet 
the required deposit is an important factor. Shared ownership initiatives are 
one policy approach designed to reduce the signiicance of these barriers. 
However, the earlier simulations have shown that, at least for some 
households (see table 7) – others are never likely to achieve ownership – 
deposits are a temporary barrier. Ownership may be delayed as the deposit is 
accumulated, but eventually the hurdle is overcome and long-run ownership 
depends on the provision of adequate housing supply.
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This inal simulation examines the impact of reducing deposit requirements, 
although it should be borne in mind that this potentially adds to housing 
market risk. One of the reasons deposits are required is because of problems 
of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Therefore, the 
simulation should be seen as illustrative of model properties rather than a 
policy recommendation.
Figure 13 shows the effect on the ownership rate, using the base scenario, 
of cutting the deposit requirement to 5 per cent. In fact, in the base case, 
deposits vary between the regions between 7 per cent and 13 per cent. 
Deposits are lower in the North than in the South. Therefore, the simulation 
represents different size changes between the areas. Nevertheless, distinctive 
features stand out. First, as expected, the short and medium term effects of 
reducing the deposit are greater than the longer term, since the deposit 
represents a temporary hurdle. For England as a whole, the increase in 
ownership rates peaks at 1.3 percentage points in 2016, but has fallen back 
to 0.6 points by the end of the simulation period. Second, the effects are 
biggest in the South, notably London. This is partly because the required 
deposit in the base is larger in these regions, but, nevertheless, higher prices 
imply that the constraint binds more strongly in the base.
Figure 13: Reducing Deposit Requirements (difference from the 
180,000 case)
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Chapter 6: Conclusions
This report presents the results from recent developments in the 
Communities and Local Government Housing Affordability Model, which is 
now regularly used both within the Department and by the National Housing 
and Planning Advice Unit. It lies behind, for example, affordability projections 
published by NHPAU in October 2007. The two major developments covered 
by the report are a new model of housing tenure and a new structure to 
determine the long-run equilibrium for the model. The former allocates 
households between owning and the two rental sectors. The latter requires a 
consideration of vacancies and demolitions.
This report sets out the underlying theory of the new model, relating its 
structure to parts of the academic literature. The results of econometric 
estimation are also presented. But sets of equations, by themselves, are not 
always adequate as a way of presenting the properties and policy 
implications. Therefore, a base scenario is constructed and a series of 
simulations run from the base. In line with the main function of the model, 
most of the simulations have operated on the supply-side of the market and 
involve increases in housing supply of different sizes. The exception is a 
simulation that examines the impact of relaxing deposit requirements for 
irst-time buyers to show how this impacts on the time proile of housing 
demand.
Chapter 5 set out a series of questions, to which answers can now be 
provided. First, it seems clear that levels of housing construction of 180,000 
units per annum in England will be insuficient to stabilise affordability. This 
is in line with the recent conclusions of NHPAU (2007). The report does, 
however, by-pass the important question of how higher levels of 
construction might be achieved. Does the construction industry have 
suficient capacity and are the industry incentives suficient to bring forth a 
large increase in supply, even if land supply is adequate? But current levels of 
construction are insuficient to match the revised household projections 
published in 2007. Furthermore, the report shows that additional housing 
services are required to meet the increasing demands of existing households. 
One of the most important innovations of the report is to move away from 
matching numbers of households to numbers of units. This is inadequate if 
improved affordability is to be a policy goal. This, in turn, is tied up with the 
quality of housing and the type of new dwellings to be completed as much 
as with the numbers of units.
Despite the changes to the model, the broad conclusions arising from the 
previous version remain intact. Allowing for the quality of the housing stock 
increases the responsiveness of house prices to changes in the level of 
construction, but the differences are not dramatic and large increases in 
construction are still necessary to induce major improvements in affordability. 
The simulations indicate that, in the long run, i.e. by 2031, an increase in 
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construction from 180,000 per annum to 240,000 per annum might 
improve affordability by approximately one percentage point.
The simulations suggest that there may be a limit to the extent to which 
affordability can be improved by further new construction. The 
improvements from increasing construction to 290,000 units from 240,000 
dwellings are slightly smaller than the increase from 180,000 to 240,000 
houses. But the results also suggest that it is possible to substitute quality for 
numbers in order to improve affordability. Therefore, the types of properties 
to be constructed are important, particularly at high levels of construction. 
The model does not suggest that all units should be at the bottom end of 
the market or aimed exclusively at irst-time buyers.
Since the model exhibits a non-linear response of affordability to changes in 
housing construction, this implies that higher levels of construction are most 
effective when concentrated on the areas of greatest shortage, primarily in 
the southern regions. Furthermore, for similar reasons, the largest effects on 
home-ownership rates are likely to occur in these regions, at least in the long 
run, since these are the regions where, currently, credit constraints are most 
binding.
The model attempts to answer the question of, who would live in the extra 
homes. First, construction at 180,000 units is insuficient even to meet 
expected future household formation. These levels imply worsening 
affordability, falling vacancies and no improvements to the quality of the 
housing stock. Arguably, at these levels, oficial household projections will 
not be met, implying lower household representative rates and higher 
average household sizes. Higher levels of construction (240,000 dwellings 
per annum), which are slightly greater than household projections, allow the 
restoration of vacancy rates towards their equilibrium, although outcomes 
depend on the regional distribution of new construction. There is little 
evidence that demolitions would be signiicant at this level of construction.
At 290,000 units per annum, the model suggests that vacancies would 
return to equilibrium in the long run and demolitions would be signiicant in 
the later years of the simulation. There is, of course, a question whether 
construction of 290,000 units could be maintained indeinitely, rather than 
as a short-run cyclical response. It might be argued that higher levels of 
vacancies and demolitions do not justify greater new construction, given the 
associated potential environmental problems. But it needs to be borne in 
mind that a certain level of private sector vacancies is necessary for the 
eficient operation of housing markets. Furthermore, turnover of the housing 
stock through demolitions and re-building is necessary to improve the quality 
of the housing stock and to make it more suitable for the demands of 
modern living. Although not discussed in this report, questions of energy 
eficiency are relevant. One of the arguments of this report is that housing 
shortages in the past have led to vacancies and demolitions below those 
expected in equilibrium.
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Targets for housing construction set in regional planning guidance are in 
terms of net additions to the housing stock. But the simulations in this report 
employ changes to gross housing starts. The difference between the two 
concepts is conversions, changes in use and demolitions. The distinction is 
not crucial when construction rates are below rates of household formation. 
However, at high levels of construction, the simulations show that 
demolitions increase well above their historical levels. Formally, in this case, 
demolitions are endogenous and are determined within the structure of the 
model. Therefore, it may not be possible to determine targets for net 
additions, even if high levels of gross starts were to be achievable.
The inal simulation concerned the demand side of the market and showed 
the importance of the credit restrictions faced by irst-time buyers in raising 
the ownership rate from the current 70 per cent level. Shared-ownership 
schemes attempt to address these problems. The simulations suggest that 
increases in new housing are unlikely to raise ownership signiicantly in the 
short and medium term, because of credit conditions. But relaxing the 
constraints brings forward the date at which irst-time buyers can enter the 
market. But this only brings a short-term beneit. Long-run sustainable home 
ownership still depends on increases in housing supply.
Finally, as noted in the introductory chapter, models continuously change 
and there are a number of directions in which the affordability model could 
develop. There are two main strands of on-going research; the irst deals 
with the incorporation of international migration lows, which are currently 
exogenous to the model. In particular, work is investigating whether migrant 
housing demands differ from domestic residents. Second, further work is 
being undertaken on the determinants of the earnings distribution in each 
region. However, there are a number of additional research possibilities for 
the longer term.
First, the regional spatial structure is taken as given. But a iner spatial scale 
of analysis would open up a rich set of further issues. Within regions lies a 
multiplicity of inter-linked local housing sub-markets, distinguished by 
housing type and neighbourhood, for example. Deining the spatial 
dimensions of housing sub markets is notoriously dificult and it is unlikely 
ever to be feasible to construct a local housing model for the country as a 
whole along the lines of our regional model. Nevertheless, there may be a 
case for modelling a sample of sub markets, for example, a selection of 
urban and rural areas. Modelling at the aggregate regional scale disguises 
different problems faced by communities.
Second, and related to the sub-market theme, the supply side of the model, 
i.e. new housing construction remains simple. New construction is the main 
policy instrument to improve affordability and, as such, is exogenous. But 
our understanding of the factors that drive new private sector supply, and 
how builders respond to incentives, remains limited. As an exogenous 
variable, in the longer term, supply does not respond to rates of return or 
observed changes in vacancy and demolition rates. In this sense, the model 
could be considered as short-run, despite the length of the time frame used 
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in simulation, and outcomes are conditional on the size of the housing stock. 
It would be valuable to understand better the reasons for the fall in housing 
supply elasticities since the nineties, noted in the Barker Review and to build 
the regulatory system directly into the model. Also it would be valuable to 
model the changes in the distribution of types of new dwellings, which have 
taken place in recent years. For example, most regions have experienced an 
increase in the share of lats.
Third, the model suggests that credit conditions are an important part of the 
explanation of declining rates of homeownership amongst the youngest 
cohorts. However, the treatment of housing inance in the model is limited. 
For example, there is no attempt to model the institutional structure of 
mortgage markets and how this affects deposit requirements and income 
multiples. Furthermore, questions of the ability of young households to 
achieve home-ownership are now closely tied into inter-generational wealth 
transfers. At one level, this is linked to the ability of households to raise a 
deposit through parental gifts. But the issues are wider.
Fourth, most research for the model has concentrated on the housing 
requirements for younger households. However, an increasingly important 
issue for the future will be the housing requirements of an ageing 
population.
Finally, more research on the relationship between rents, housing asset prices 
and the user cost would be desirable. The model adopts simplifying 
assumptions necessary to maintain tenure shares in the long run. Historically, 
because of rental controls, obtaining high quality data on free market rents 
in this country was dificult and, therefore, the relationships were dificult to 
test. But the expansion of the private rental market since the mid-nineties 
opens up the prospect that more research will be feasible in the future.
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Appendix 1: The Tenure 
Equations
The variables in the following table are used in the probit equations for each 
of the age groups below.
The Determinants of Tenure Choice
Variables Definition
headage age of head
headagesq age of head squared
nchild  no. of children
Imaritals-1 spouse present and married
Imaritals-2 spouse present and cohabiting
Iheadmale male head of household
rahincome real household income (£1,000)
ImodW3C Indicator of binding deposit constraint (0,1)
ImodY3C Indicator of binding income multiple constraint (0,1)
rsrs  real social rents (£1,000)
UCC  housing user cost (£1,000)
rrent  real private rents (£1,000)
relrsrs  rsrs – rrent
SOUTH  Southern Regions (London, SE, EA, SW)
SOUTHRELRSRS SOUTH*relrsrs
Iloo  In owner occupation in the previous period
Ilsrs  In social renting in the previous period
Iloun  Regional unemployment rate
Iregion, Iyear Region and time dummies (London is the default)
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Age Group 20-39
Probit model with sample selection Number of obs = 10760
 Wald chi2(24) = 627.87
Log pseudolikelihood = –2118.611 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 2029 clusters in pid)
Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P> | z | [95% Conf. Interval]
PRS
_Imaritals~1 -.3862556 .1475167 -2.62 0.009 -.6753831 -.0971281
_Imaritals~2 -.6587854 .144766 -4.55 0.000 -.9425215 -.3750492
nchild -.2633698 .0437777 -6.02 0.000 -.3491724 -.1775671
relrsrs .5630189 .1490939 3.78 0.000 .2708002 .8552376
SOUTHRELRSRS -.4461815 .1321135 -3.38 0.001 -.7051192 -.1872439
rahincome .0362085 .0118114 3.07 0.002 .0130586 .0593584
_Ilsrs_1 -2.24149 .1118524 -20.04 0.000 -2.460717 -2.022263
_Iregion_3 -.235173 .1853999 -1.27 0.205 -.5985501 .128204
_Iregion_4 -.1858673 .2519346 -0.74 0.461 -.67965 .3079153
_Iregion_6 .5081146 .3691341 1.38 0.169 -.2153749 1.231604
_Iregion_7 .7268218 .4896101 1.48 0.138 -.2327964 1.68644
_Iregion_9 .309087 .3629644 0.85 0.394 -.4023102 1.020484
_Iregion_12 .5526323 .4015803 1.38 0.169 -.2344505 1.339715
_Iregion_15 .2776147 .3977506 0.70 0.485 -.5019622 1.057192
_Iyear_93 -.1636161 .190791 -0.86 0.391 -.5375597 .2103275
_Iyear_94 .3852761 .2364123 1.63 0.103 -.0780835 .8486356
_Iyear_95 .6256439 .2177403 2.87 0.004 .1988807 1.052407
_Iyear_96 .6466834 .2214474 2.92 0.003 .2126545 1.080712
_Iyear_97 .5866472 .2112057 2.78 0.005 .1726916 1.000603
_Iyear_98 .2969046 .2112833 1.41 0.160 -.117203 .7110122
_Iyear_99 .4148454 .1929583 2.15 0.032 .036654 .7930368
_Iyear_100 .2792461 .2343637 1.19 0.233 -.1800984 .7385905
_Iyear_101 .2535511 .2150305 1.18 0.238 -.1679009 .6750031
_Iyear_102 .6689361 .2555974 2.62 0.009 .1679745 1.169898
_cons .8572983 .3433667 2.50 0.013 .184312 1.530285
nothomeown
_Imaritals~1 -.5791168 .1067575 -5.42 0.000 -.7883577 -.3698759
_Imaritals~2 -.4663289 .1115581 -4.18 0.000 -.6849787 -.2476792
nchild .0614654 .0297596 2.07 0.039 .0031377 .1197932
rahincome -.0087143 .0065048 -1.34 0.180 -.0214634 .0040348
UCC .4506131 .0501041 8.99 0.000 .3524109 .5488153
rrent -.6476139 .0397058 -16.31 0.000 -.7254359 -.5697919
_ImodW3C_1 .5796116 .0892158 6.50 0.000 .4047519 .7544713
_ImodY3C_1 .594727 .1589363 3.74 0.000 .2832175 .9062365
_Iloo_1 -2.334171 .079913 -29.21 0.000 -2.490798 -2.177545
_Iheadmale_1 -.088504 .0704607 -1.26 0.209 -.2266045 .0495965
Iloun -.0954566 .0539761 -1.77 0.077 -.2012478 .0103346
_Iregion_3 -.8792557 .2990344 -2.94 0.003 -1.465352 -.2931591
_Iregion_4 -1.443472 .3212955 -4.49 0.000 -2.0732 -.8137449
_Iregion_6 -1.832719 .3450203 -5.31 0.000 -2.508947 -1.156492
_Iregion_7 -1.878633 .2662473 -7.06 0.000 -2.400468 -1.356798
_Iregion_9 -1.985992 .2828285 -7.02 0.000 -2.540325 -1.431658
_Iregion_12 -1.832166 .3099104 -5.91 0.000 -2.43958 -1.224753
_Iregion_15 -1.382236 .2543178 -5.44 0.000 -1.880689 -.883782
_Iyear_93 .2055525 .1198366 1.72 0.086 -.0293229 .4404279
_Iyear_94 1.273524 .1661516 7.66 0.000 .9478733 1.599176
_Iyear_95 1.117439 .1670365 6.69 0.000 .7900539 1.444825
_Iyear_96 1.472818 .2091865 7.04 0.000 1.06282 1.882816
_Iyear_97 .8064885 .2188505 3.69 0.000 .3775493 1.235428
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Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P> | z | [95% Conf. Interval]
_Iyear_98 .2972877 .2376994 1.25 0.211 -.1685946 .7631701
_Iyear_99 .5666545 .2540624 2.23 0.026 .0687013 1.064608
_Iyear_100 .3285201 .2684908 1.22 0.221 -.1977123 .8547525
_Iyear_101 .7021544 .2860919 2.45 0.014 .1414245 1.262884
_Iyear_102 .8087155 .2675215 3.02 0.003 .284383 1.333048
_cons 2.54902 .9306644 2.74 0.006 .7249517 4.373089
/athrho 1.08107 .1245022 8.68 0.000 .8370503 1.32509
rho .7935956 .0460915 .6842435 .8680442
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Age Group 40-59
Probit model with sample selection Number of obs = 14385
 Wald chi2(24)  =  451.48
Log pseudolikelihood = –1125.994 Prob > chi2  =  0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 2298 clusters in pid)
Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P> | z | [95% Conf. Interval]
PRS
_Imaritals~1 -.3624659 .1817137 -1.99 0.046 -.7186183 -.0063136
_Imaritals~2 -.2762198 .2767433 -1.00 0.318 -.8186267 .2661871
nchild -.1176934 .054362 -2.16 0.030 -.224241 -.0111458
relrsrs .2520451 .18233 1.38 0.167 -.1053151 .6094053
SOUTHRELRSRS -.0580868 .1639664 -0.35 0.723 -.379455 .2632814
rahincome .0442983 .0165071 2.68 0.007 .011945 .0766517
_Ilsrs_1 -3.181236 .2108743 -15.09 0.000 -3.594542 -2.76793
_Iregion_3 .106943 .2184091 0.49 0.624 -.321131 .535017
_Iregion_4 -.1238355 .2968512 -0.42 0.677 -.7056532 .4579822
_Iregion_6 .0310534 .422167 0.07 0.941 -.7963787 .8584856
_Iregion_7 -.5540409 .4852137 -1.14 0.254 -1.505042 .3969605
_Iregion_9 -.698777 .4270375 -1.64 0.102 -1.535755 .1382011
_Iregion_12 -.7520184 .4986178 -1.51 0.132 -1.729291 .2252546
_Iregion_15 -.2818168 .4198134 -0.67 0.502 -1.104636 .5410024
_Iyear_93 -.4418055 .3010435 -1.47 0.142 -1.03184 .1482289
_Iyear_94 .2673752 .2690931 0.99 0.320 -.2600376 .7947879
_Iyear_95 .2511269 .2599896 0.97 0.334 -.2584434 .7606973
_Iyear_96 -.55394 .2831697 -1.96 0.050 -1.108942 .0010624
_Iyear_97 .1635018 .2774921 0.59 0.556 -.3803728 .7073765
_Iyear_98 .2005384 .2567372 0.78 0.435 -.3026573 .7037341
_Iyear_99 -.1237935 .3155404 -0.39 0.695 -.7422412 .4946542
_Iyear_100 -.3462796 .2662279 -1.30 0.193 -.8680766 .1755175
_Iyear_101 .1481982 .2804758 0.53 0.597 -.4015242 .6979206
_Iyear_102 .1973793 .3217355 0.61 0.540 -.4332107 .8279694
_cons 1.440063 .4256575 3.38 0.001 .6057899 2.274337
nothomeown
headage -.2573231 .1090053 -2.36 0.018 -.4709696 -.0436765
headagesq .0025907 .0010933 2.37 0.018 .0004478 .0047335
_Imaritals~1 -.2723898 .141716 -1.92 0.055 -.5501481 .0053686
_Imaritals~2 .0946911 .2017497 0.47 0.639 -.3007309 .4901132
rahincome -.0122691 .0085933 -1.43 0.153 -.0291116 .0045734
UCC .3539106 .0807142 4.38 0.000 .1957137 .5121076
rrent -.6843327 .065266 -10.49 0.000 -.8122517 -.5564137
_Iloo_1 -3.482102 .1179435 -29.52 0.000 -3.713267 -3.250937
Iloun -.2433731 .058358 -4.17 0.000 -.3577527 -.1289935
_Iregion_3 -1.719322 .3550864 -4.84 0.000 -2.415279 -1.023366
_Iregion_4 -2.571994 .3743136 -6.87 0.000 -3.305635 -1.838353
_Iregion_6 -2.758991 .4037626 -6.83 0.000 -3.550351 -1.967631
_Iregion_7 -2.474502 .3278132 -7.55 0.000 -3.117004 -1.832
_Iregion_9 -2.556238 .3411352 -7.49 0.000 -3.224851 -1.887626
_Iregion_12 -2.393458 .3601108 -6.65 0.000 -3.099262 -1.687654
_Iregion_15 -1.725953 .3375124 -5.11 0.000 -2.387465 -1.06444
_Iyear_93 -.1242426 .1451135 -0.86 0.392 -.4086598 .1601747
_Iyear_94 .8754759 .2394149 3.66 0.000 .4062313 1.34472
_Iyear_95 .7617539 .2613883 2.91 0.004 .2494422 1.274066
_Iyear_96 1.05285 .3049634 3.45 0.001 .4551324 1.650567
_Iyear_97 .2323251 .2794619 0.83 0.406 -.3154102 .7800603
_Iyear_98 -.2507849 .2689986 -0.93 0.351 -.7780124 .2764426
_Iyear_99 .0783699 .2979526 0.26 0.793 -.5056066 .6623463
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Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P> | z | [95% Conf. Interval]
_Iyear_100 -.4315679 .3085024 -1.40 0.162 -1.036222 .1730857
_Iyear_101 -.1778857 .3399739 -0.52 0.601 -.8442223 .4884509
_Iyear_102 .2252109 .3252742 0.69 0.489 -.4123148 .8627366
_cons 12.47509 2.891181 4.31 0.000 6.808478 18.1417
/athrho .6226962 .2624645 2.37 0.018 .1082752 1.137117
rho .5530025 .1821998 .107854 .8134411
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Age Group 60+
Probit model with sample selection  Number of obs = 10562
 Wald chi2(21)  = 577.08
Log pseudolikelihood = –761.6014  Prob > chi2  =  0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 1490 clusters in pid)
Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P> | z | [95% Conf. Interval]
PRS
nchild -.4242258 .121486 -3.49 0.000 -.6623339 -.1861177
rahincome .0250947 .0139003 1.81 0.071 -.0021493 .0523387
_Ilsrs_1 -3.138296 .1835342 -17.10 0.000 -3.498017 -2.778576
_Iheadmale_1 -.2394267 .1342925 -1.78 0.075 -.5026352 .0237819
_Iregion_3 .1789501 .1670708 1.07 0.284 -.1485026 .5064029
_Iregion_4 .000348 .2342593 0.00 0.999 -.4587918 .4594877
_Iregion_6 -.1364571 .2227489 -0.61 0.540 -.5730369 .3001227
_Iregion_7 -.2460694 .251557 -0.98 0.328 -.7391121 .2469733
_Iregion_9 -.5110795 .3425481 -1.49 0.136 -1.182461 .1603024
_Iregion_12 -.2907376 .2606931 -1.12 0.265 -.8016867 .2202115
_Iregion_15 -.4298864 .2569569 -1.67 0.094 -.9335127 .0737398
_Iyear_93 -.0098999 .3481714 -0.03 0.977 -.6923034 .6725036
_Iyear_94 -.5648851 .3428454 -1.65 0.099 -1.23685 .1070795
_Iyear_95 -.0407118 .2911939 -0.14 0.889 -.6114414 .5300177
_Iyear_96 -.1756722 .2980899 -0.59 0.556 -.7599178 .4085733
_Iyear_97 -.0916027 .2796517 -0.33 0.743 -.63971 .4565045
_Iyear_98 -.1764421 .2427905 -0.73 0.467 -.6523027 .2994185
_Iyear_99 .0478446 .2798239 0.17 0.864 -.5006002 .5962895
_Iyear_100 -.2330903 .2444083 -0.95 0.340 -.7121217 .2459411
_Iyear_101 .2634857 .2635102 1.00 0.317 -.2529848 .7799562
_Iyear_102 -.192343 .2684767 -0.72 0.474 -.7185476 .3338616
_cons .9807807 .306511 3.20 0.001 .3800301 1.581531
nothomeown
headage -.2222441 .1280093 -1.74 0.083 -.4731377 .0286495
headagesq .0015146 .0008869 1.71 0.088 -.0002238 .0032529
rahincome -.0470535 .010767 -4.37 0.000 -.0681564 -.0259506
UCC .6059272 .0891009 6.80 0.000 .4312927 .7805617
rrent -.7450923 .0629744 -11.83 0.000 -.8685198 -.6216647
_Iloo_1 -3.772672 .1521057 -24.80 0.000 -4.070794 -3.47455
Iloun -.1960364 .0947325 -2.07 0.039 -.3817088 -.010364
_Iregion_3 -.7072187 .5923128 -1.19 0.232 -1.868131 .4536931
_Iregion_4 -1.61752 .5969233 -2.71 0.007 -2.787468 -.4475723
_Iregion_6 -1.47562 .6166811 -2.39 0.017 -2.684293 -.2669474
_Iregion_7 -1.107041 .484232 -2.29 0.022 -2.056119 -.157964
_Iregion_9 -1.369424 .5462178 -2.51 0.012 -2.439991 -.2988566
_Iregion_12 -1.227725 .5632468 -2.18 0.029 -2.331669 -.1237819
_Iregion_15 -.89795 .478417 -1.88 0.061 -1.83563 .0397301
_Iyear_93 .4339941 .1811502 2.40 0.017 .0789462 .7890419
_Iyear_94 1.624607 .2861557 5.68 0.000 1.063752 2.185462
_Iyear_95 1.734168 .3040267 5.70 0.000 1.138287 2.33005
_Iyear_96 1.581205 .4407174 3.59 0.000 .7174145 2.444995
_Iyear_97 .8684477 .3461547 2.51 0.012 .1899969 1.546898
_Iyear_98 .2408472 .4274805 0.56 0.573 -.5969992 1.078694
_Iyear_99 .7786878 .4850573 1.61 0.108 -.1720069 1.729383
_Iyear_100 .1138931 .452296 0.25 0.801 -.7725908 1.000377
_Iyear_101 .4126077 .485537 0.85 0.395 -.5390273 1.364243
_Iyear_102 .8010617 .4646833 1.72 0.085 -.1097008 1.711824
_cons 11.35014 4.431764 2.56 0.010 2.664043 20.03624
/athrho .2927256 .1331244 2.20 0.028 .0318065 .5536447
rho .2846416 .1223386 .0317958 .5032469
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Appendix 2: Equations 
to Determine the Model 
Long-Run Equilibrium
The Variables in the Hedonic Equations
Variables Definition
norooms Number of rooms in the property
Detach Dummy = 1 if detached property
Semidet Dummy = 1 if semi-detached property
Terrace Dummy = 1 if terraced property
newdwel Dummy = 1 if newly-built property
age19-39 Dummy = 1 if property built between 1919 and 1939
age40-60 Dummy = 1 if property built between 1940 and 1960
age61-80 Dummy = 1 if property built between 1961 and 1980
agepost80 Dummy = 1 if property built after 1980
yr1999 Dummy = 1 if observation in 1999 
yr2001 Dummy = 1 if observation in 2001
Table 2.1 Hedonic Price Equation: Pooled Data, 1997, 1999, 2001 (local 
authority dummy variables are excluded from the table)
London E Midlands
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
(Constant) 11.006 433.99 (Constant) 9.819 275.17
norooms 0.120 34.98 norooms 0.126 38.48
detach 0.611 27.93 detach 0.622 26.64
semidet 0.330 21.09 semidet 0.223 9.75
terrac 0.203 16.28 terrac 0.021 0.93
newdwel 0.082 3.83 newdwel 0.090 5.46
age19-39 -0.162 -12.56 age19-39 -0.085 -5.11
age40-60 -0.311 -18.31 age40-60 -0.177 -10.59
age61-80 -0.297 -17.60 age61-80 -0.125 -8.22
agepost80 -0.119 -7.26 agepost80 -0.049 -3.39
yr1999 0.358 34.70 yr1999 0.140 13.24
yr2001 0.707 56.84 yr2001 0.385 33.36
South East W Midlands
(Constant) 10.182 560.03 (Constant) 10.176 348.73
norooms 0.111 59.25 norooms 0.115 32.66
detach 0.655 60.24 Detach 0.578 26.31
semidet 0.304 29.66 semidet 0.194 9.46
terrac 0.161 16.99 Terrace -0.041 -2.01
newdwel 0.048 4.21 newdwel 0.126 6.65
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Table 2.1 Hedonic Price Equation: Pooled Data, 1997, 1999, 2001 (local 
authority dummy variables are excluded from the table)
South East W Midlands
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
age19-39 -0.108 -10.43 age19-39 -0.111 -6.41
age40-60 -0.189 -18.38 age40-60 -0.184 -10.50
age61-80 -0.156 -17.61 age61-80 -0.133 -8.17
agepost80 -0.116 -12.67 agepost80 -0.018 -1.07
yr1999 0.268 37.69 yr1999 0.140 12.95
yr2001 0.593 71.35 yr2001 0.381 30.44
East Yorkshire and Humberside
(Constant) 9.909 338.09 (Constant) 9.970 293.77
norooms 0.122 42.76 norooms 0.136 40.62
detach 0.609 37.58 Detach 0.442 18.13
semidet 0.288 18.21 semidet 0.068 2.88
terrac 0.120 8.03 Terrace -0.157 -6.78
newdwel 0.065 4.25 newdwel 0.134 7.65
age19-39 -0.123 -7.60 age19-39 -0.059 -3.75
age40-60 -0.201 -13.09 age40-60 -0.146 -8.56
age61-80 -0.179 -13.72 age61-80 -0.061 -3.98
agepost80 -0.119 -9.15 agepost80 0.003 0.19
yr1999 0.174 14.50 yr1999 0.092 8.33
yr2001 0.520 40.29 yr2001 0.245 20.58
South West North West
(Constant) 10.376 493.25 (Constant) 10.305 336.02
norooms 0.119 44.39 norooms 0.136 40.23
detach 0.509 32.80 Detach 0.427 19.51
semidet 0.162 10.73 semidet 0.060 2.91
terrac 0.015 1.04 Terrace -0.211 -10.48
newdwel -0.016 -1.10 newdwel 0.160 9.81
age19-39 -0.138 -9.18 age19-39 -0.054 -3.64
age40-60 -0.220 -15.06 age40-60 -0.124 -7.56
age61-80 -0.174 -14.12 age61-80 -0.044 -2.97
agepost80 -0.135 -11.56 agepost80 0.029 1.89
yr1999 0.205 21.02 yr1999 0.106 10.66
yr2001 0.534 46.78 yr2001 0.296 26.25
North East
(Constant) 9.635 187.27
norooms 0.157 26.53
detach 0.517 16.42
semidet 0.188 6.67
terrac -0.020 -0.74
newdwel 0.163 5.54
age19-39 -0.134 -5.11
age40-60 -0.252 -9.36
age61-80 -0.056 -2.25
agepost80 0.114 4.26
yr1999 0.140 7.77
yr2001 0.263 13.03
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Table 2.2 Modelling Vacancies (more than six months)
Dependent Variable: VAC
Included observations: 310
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -344.0854 99.90553 -3.444107 0.0007
VAC(-1) 0.560527 0.042898 13.06665 0.0000
IMD(-1) 6.663811 3.035397 2.195368 0.0289
DUP(-1) 156.9278 132.0186 1.188680 0.2355
HS(-1) 0.008469 0.001432 5.914437 0.0000
(HS-HH)(-1) 0.033157 0.010656 3.111732 0.0020
DUMNW 198.7301 82.14032 2.419398 0.0161
DUMWM 153.6739 90.75966 1.693196 0.0914
R-squared 0.808542 Mean dependent var 893.9935
Adjusted R-squared 0.804105 S.D. dependent var 998.1961
S.E. of regression 441.8022
DUMNW, DUMWM are dummy variables for the NW and WM. These were 
insigniicant in the other regions. Remaining variables are deined in the 
main text.
Table 2.3 Modelling Vacancies (more than six months) – Alternative Form
Dependent Variable: DVAC  
Included observations: 310  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.486379 43.76429 -0.011114 0.9911
(VAC-VAC*)(-1) -0.439528 0.042489 -10.34462 0.0000
DUP(-1) 157.0110 103.1454 1.522231 0.1290
(HS-HH)(-1) 0.033093 0.008677 3.813916 0.0002
DUMWM 153.6085 87.33242 1.758895 0.0796
DUMNW 198.7797 77.94000 2.550419 0.0112
R-squared 0.280923 Mean dependent var -4.680645
Adjusted R-squared 0.269096 S.D. dependent var 515.0679
S.E. of regression 440.3466
Remaining variables are deined in the main text.
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Table 2.4 Modelling Vacancies (less than six months)
Dependent Variable: VAC – short term 
Included observations: 305 after adjustments 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 227.4054 60.94968 3.731036 0.0002
VAC – short 
term (-1) 0.588307 0.035782 16.44159 0.0000
HS(-1) 0.001433 0.000723 1.981970 0.0484
(HS-HH)(-1) 0.033552 0.011913 2.816442 0.0052
DUMWM -222.5154 103.4615 -2.150706 0.0323
DUMNW -218.0787 92.34019 -2.361688 0.0188
DUMEM -184.2574 98.44058 -1.871763 0.0622
R-squared 0.653208 Mean dependent var 873.5836
Adjusted R-squared 0.646225 S.D. dependent var 873.4594
S.E. of regression 519.5245
DUMNW, DUMWM, DUMEM are dummy variables for the NW, WM and EM. 
Remaining variables are deined in the main text.
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Table 2.5 Modelling Holiday Homes
Dependent Variable: HOLIDAY  
Method: ML – Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Included observations: 11238 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -11.00294 0.763209 -14.41667 0.0000
NW 0.522690 0.272750 1.916373 0.0553
YH 0.430454 0.285050 1.510099 0.1310
EM 0.232349 0.297404 0.781255 0.4347
WM 0.500633 0.278381 1.798372 0.0721
EAST 0.533909 0.272894 1.956473 0.0504
GL 0.846673 0.266258 3.179897 0.0015
SW 0.586188 0.272993 2.147265 0.0318
SE 0.610016 0.263955 2.311058 0.0208
MALE -0.091931 0.083877 -1.096024 0.2731
MARRIED 0.243535 0.125366 1.942592 0.0521
SINGLE 0.231047 0.177179 1.304030 0.1922
ln(Income) 0.504907 0.049021 10.29986 0.0000
AGE 0.092186 0.019120 4.821508 0.0000
AGE2 -0.000650 0.000173 -3.756130 0.0002
S.E. of regression 0.121689 Akaike info criterion 0.140475
LR statistic (14 df) 247.0945 McFadden R-squared 0.137599
Obs with Dep=0 11064 Total obs 11238
Obs with Dep=1 174
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Table 2.6 Right to Buy Sales
Dependent Variable: ln(RTB/LAST)  
Method: Pooled Least Squares  
Sample: 1992 2005  
Total pool (balanced) observations: 126
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant 0.593830 0.304968 1.947187 0.0540
Ln(RTB/LAST)
(-1) 0.868007 0.071295 12.17492 0.0000
Dln(PH/P) 1.166394 0.386478 3.018009 0.0032
ln(PH/P)(-1) -0.641676 0.148517 -4.320539 0.0000
DISC 0.865733 0.536490 1.613698 0.1094
RBM -0.133052 0.028872 -4.608344 0.0000
Fixed Effects
NE 0.116621 E -0.084166
NW 0.074886 GL -0.100572
YH 0.095916 SE -0.089235
EM 0.052554 SW -0.092414
WM 0.026410
R-squared 0.811957 Mean dependent var 2.650873
Adjusted R-squared 0.790130 S.D. dependent var 0.428465
S.E. of regression 0.196286
Variables are deined in the main text, except RTB = number of Right-to-Buy 
sales and LAST = local authority housing stock, measured in numbers of 
units.
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Table 2.7 Right to Buy Sales – Restricted Version
Dependent Variable: ln(RTB/LAST)  
Method: Pooled Least Squares  
Sample: 1992 2005  
Total pool (balanced) observations: 126
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant 1.219321 0.228644 5.332826 0.0000
ln(RTB/LAST)
(-1) 0.636748 0.071344 8.925099 0.0000
COST -0.134961 0.029517 -4.572326 0.0000
Fixed Effects
NE 0.078238 E -0.008849
NW -0.023683 GL -0.043026
YH 0.020519 SE -0.028203
EM 0.027305 SW -0.056123
WM 0.033823
R-squared 0.677900 Mean dependent var 2.650873
Adjusted R-squared 0.649891 S.D. dependent var 0.428465
S.E. of regression 0.253522
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